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Note 
 
Legislating Corporate Social Responsibility: 
Expanding Social Disclosure Through the 
Resource Extraction Disclosure Rule 
Thea Reilkoff*
On July 21, 2010, in the wake of a global recession, Con-
gress enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Con-
sumer Protection (Dodd-Frank) Act
 
1 to promote the financial 
stability of the country. Dodd-Frank introduced the most 
sweeping (and contentious) reforms in the financial regulatory 
system since the Great Depression,2 ending “too big to fail” and 
taxpayer bailouts.3 But the statute included “other purposes” 
far removed from Wall Street reform, which have proved just as 
contentious.4 One such provision includes increasing interna-
tional transparency in the production of oil, natural gas, and 
minerals.5 Section 1504 of the Act, also known as the Cardin-
Lugar Amendment,6
 
*  J.D. Candidate 2014, University of Minnesota Law School; M.S. 2000, 
Oregon Graduate Institute of Science & Technology; B.S. 1997, Mayville State 
University. I would like to thank Professor Jennifer Green for her invaluable 
insight and assistance with this Note. A special thanks also goes to Professor 
Richard Painter for reviewing an earlier draft of this manuscript and provid-
ing insight on regulating social disclosure; to Jordan Weber, Emily Wessels, 
and the staff of the Minnesota Law Review for their important contributions 
and dedication; and to my husband, Ron, and three children, Avery, Alexan-
dra, and Aksel, for their immeasurable patience and support over the last 
three years. Copyright © 2014 by Thea Reilkoff.  
 directed the Securities and Exchange 
 1. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sec-
tions of the U.S. Code).  
 2. Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Sec’y, Remarks by 
the President on 21st Century Financial Regulatory Reform (June 17, 2009), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-of-the 
-President-on-Regulatory-Reform (“[M]y administration is proposing a sweep-
ing overhaul of the financial regulatory system, a transformation on a scale 
not seen since the reforms that followed the Great Depression.”). 
 3. 124 Stat. at 1376. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Dodd-Frank § 1504, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(q) (2012). 
 6. Press Release, Ben Cardin, U.S. Senator for Md., Cardin, Lugar, 
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Commission (SEC) to promulgate final rules requiring all com-
panies listed on the U.S. stock exchanges and engaged in the 
commercial development of oil, natural gas, or minerals, to dis-
close payments (i.e., taxes, royalties, fees, etc.) made to foreign 
governments for the purpose of commercial resource develop-
ment.7 The law seeks to abate the “resource curse” that plagues 
so many resource-rich countries.8 The mandated disclosure 
rules are intended to shine light on the disparity that exists be-
tween the extraction revenues received by a government and 
that government’s expenditures on societal needs (e.g., clean 
water, food, heath, education), thereby empowering citizens 
with the information needed to hold leaders accountable. The 
rules are not the first of their kind, but are recognized as a nec-
essary compliment to the existing volunteer-based Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) introduced by United 
Kingdom (UK) Prime Minister Tony Blair in 2002 to promote 
state adoption of an international transparency standard.9 And 
they are consistent with a growing international trend to in-
crease the transparency of labor standards and environmental 
risk and, more generally, to promote corporate social responsi-
bility in all sectors of business.10
 
Leahy Welcome SEC Approval of Transparency Rules (Aug. 22, 2012), availa-
ble at http://www.cardin.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/cardin-lugar-leahy 
-welcome-sec-approval-of-transparency-rules. 
 
 7. Dodd-Frank § 1504, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(q). 
 8. Press Release, Cardin, supra note 6; see also Luis A. Aguilar, Comm’r, 
SEC, Statement at SEC Open Meeting: Facilitating Transparency of Resource 
Revenue Payments to Protect Investors (Aug. 22, 2012), available at https:// 
www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1365171490958#.Ux-BDIXFnXY 
(“Transparency empowers citizens, investors, regulators, and other watchdogs 
and is a necessary ingredient of good governance for countries and companies 
alike.” (quoting 156 CONG. REC. S3816 (daily ed. May 17, 2010) (statement of 
Sen. Lugar))). 
 9. See generally EITI, http://eiti.org/ (last visited Apr. 22, 2014). The 
United States joined the EITI in 2011. Samuel Rubenfeld, US Joins Extractive 
Industry Transparency Initiative amid Open Government Launch, WALL ST. J. 
BLOGS (Sept. 20, 2011, 4:31 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/corruption-currents/ 
2011/09/20/us-joins-extractive-industry-transparency-initiative-amid-open 
-government-launch/. For information on the Open Government launch, see 
Open Government Declaration, OPEN GOV’T P’SHIP, http://www 
.opengovpartnership.org/about/open-government-declaration (last visited Apr. 
22, 2014) (promoting transparency, citizen engagement, and access to enabling 
technology). 
 10. Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Hu-
man Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United 
Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, ¶ 2, Human Rights Coun-
cil, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011) (by John Ruggie) [hereinafter 
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The SEC adopted the final rules in a 2-1 vote on August 22, 
2012,11 against strong opposition from industry groups12 and 
493 days past the deadline imposed by law.13 Less than one 
month later, the European Parliament followed suit, calling for 
the European Commission to establish rules that match, if not 
exceed, the requirements imposed by the U.S. rule.14
On October 10, 2012, the American Petroleum Institute 
(API) and U.S. Chamber of Commerce, along with two other or-
ganizations, filed a lawsuit against the SEC in the U.S. District 
Court for the District of Columbia.
 Their 
reach will extend to many of the same firms, given the transna-
tional nature of the extractive industry. 
15
 
Guiding Principles] (articulating a state’s responsibility to protect and busi-
nesses’ responsibility to respect human rights under existing international 
law); U.N. GLOBAL COMPACT, http://www.unglobalcompact.org/ (last visited 
Apr. 22, 2014) (providing a voluntary initiative for businesses and other 
stakeholders to commit to promotion of universally accepted principles in the 
areas of human rights, labor, environment, and anti-corruption throughout 
their supply chain); see also MICHAEL KERR ET AL., CORPORATE SOCIAL RE-
SPONSIBILITY: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 1 (Chip Pitts ed., 2009) (“[C]orporations are 
seeking to redefine themselves as socially responsible. . . . [C]ompanies every-
where are lining up to sign on to codes of conduct covering environmental, so-
cial and economic performance.”); About the HRCA, HUM. RTS. COMPLIANCE 
ASSESSMENT, https://hrca2.humanrightsbusiness.org/Page-AboutTheHrca-1 
.aspx (last visited Apr. 22, 2014) (providing a comprehensive tool designed to 
identify human rights risk in company operations). 
 The industry groups chal-
lenged the new rules under the First Amendment of the U.S. 
 11. Press Release, SEC, SEC Adopts Rules Requiring Payment Disclo-
sures by Resource Extraction Issuers (Aug. 22, 2012), available at http:// 
www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1365171484028#.U0Yhe 
1fBc0Y; Christopher M. Matthews, SEC Narrowly Approves Reporting Rules 
on Resource Extraction, Conflict Minerals, WALL ST. J. BLOGS (Aug. 22, 2012, 
12:48 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/corruption-currents/2012/08/22/sec-narrowly 
-approves-reporting-rules-for-energy-mining-firms/. Two members of the SEC 
recused themselves from the vote. Matthews, supra. 
 12. Letter from Harry M. Ng, Vice President, Gen. Counsel & Corp. Sec’y, 
API, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, SEC 3–5 (Jan. 19, 2012), available at 
http://sec.gov/comments/s7-42-10/s74210-121.pdf; see also GRANT D. ALDONAS, 
ANALYSIS OF SECTION 1504 OF THE WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER 
PROTECTION ACT 21 (2011), available at http://www.api.org/~/media/Files/ 
Policy/Congress/Analysis_Section_1504_paper.ashx (noting industry’s claim 
that the proposed rules would require firms to violate existing contracts in 
countries that prohibit certain disclosures). 
 13. See Dodd-Frank § 1504, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(q)(2)(A) (2012) (requiring the 
SEC to issue final rules no later than 270 days after the date of enactment of 
the Act or April 17, 2011). 
 14. See Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers, 77 Fed. 
Reg. 56,365 (Sept. 12, 2012) (originally codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249). 
 15. Complaint, Am. Petroleum Inst. v. SEC, 953 F. Supp. 2d 5 (D.D.C. 
2013) (No. 12-1668), 2012 WL 4803691. 
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Constitution, the Securities Exchange Act of 193416 (Exchange 
Act), and the Administrative Procedure Act17 (APA), claiming 
that the SEC “grossly misinterpreted its statutory mandate,” 
forcing companies to publicly disclose more than Congress re-
quired, and failing to properly assess the costs of compliance—
including the burden on competition—and the benefits to 
shareholders and citizens of resource-rich countries.18 On July 
2, 2013, the court vacated the rule and remanded to the SEC 
for further proceedings.19 As of the time of this writing, the SEC 
has yet to reissue the rule.20
This Note discusses the importance of section 1504 in both 
the national and international context as a model for future so-
cial disclosure rules across diverse industries and as part of the 
growing international movement for transparency in the ex-
traction industry, in particular. Part I explores the develop-
ment of section 1504: its origins in the decade-long “Publish 
What You Pay” campaign for transparency and the existing, 
but inadequate, Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative. 
Part II carefully examines the congressional mandate and the 
SEC’s exercise of discretion in rulemaking,
  
21 the SEC’s cost-
benefit analysis, and the review standard adopted by the D.C. 
Circuit in similar cases. Because the district court’s decision to 
vacate and remand does not preclude the SEC from promulgat-
ing a substantially similar rule, this Note focuses on the argu-
ments which support the rule as written.22
 
 16. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78pp. 
 Part II also analyzes 
 17. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559 (2012). 
 18. Complaint, supra note 15, at 2–7; see also Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 § 3(f), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(f) (requiring the SEC to consider, in addition to the 
protection of investors, whether the action will promote efficiency, competi-
tion, and capital formation”); Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction 
Issuers, 77 Fed. Reg. at 56,397–403. 
 19. Am. Petroleum Inst., 953 F. Supp. 2d 5. 
 20. Stella Dawson, SEC Omits Extractive Industry Rules from Its 2014 
Priority List, THOMPSON REUTERS FOUND. (Dec. 9, 2013, 12:51 PM), http:// 
www.trust.org/item/20131209125125-6gr27/. In addition, the SEC omitted the 
rule from its 2014 priority list. Id. 
 21. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(f), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(f) (requir-
ing the SEC to “); see also Daniel M. Gallagher, Comm’r, SEC, Statement at 
SEC Open Meeting: Proposed Rules to Implement Section 1504 of the Dodd-
Frank Act (“Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers”) (Aug. 22, 
2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1365171 
490864#.U1acJFfBc0Y (stating that such rulemaking is in conflict with the 
SEC mission and prohibited by Congress). 
 22. The court did not consider industry’s First Amendment claim or many 
of its APA claims. Am. Petroleum Inst., 953 F. Supp. 2d at 11. 
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section 1504 in the context of the growing movement to legis-
late transparency for social needs. Part III discusses what 
needs to be done to achieve the objectives of section 1504 and 
what steps can be taken to expand transparency beyond the ex-
traction industry. 
This Note concludes that mandatory disclosure rules are 
necessary to promote and protect human rights and that the 
SEC acted in accordance with legislative intent and within its 
statutory authority in promulgating a rule now consistent with 
strong European Union (EU) rules and strengthened EITI re-
porting standards. While Congress may be required to further 
clarify the SEC’s mandate under the Exchange Act, section 
1504 should serve as a model for expanding social disclosure to 
meet the growing demand for corporate transparency. Im-
portantly, this Note recognizes that disclosure rules are insuffi-
cient on their own. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) 
must be tasked with using the information disclosed to advo-
cate for effective change. 
I.  THE NEED FOR STRONG “PUBLISH WHAT YOU PAY” 
LAWS AND CONGRESS’S MANDATE TO THE SEC   
The call for transparency is not new. It was nearly forty 
years ago when the discovery of millions of dollars of question-
able and illegal corporate payments and corrupt practices 
pushed the SEC to “insure [sic] that investors and shareholders 
receive material facts necessary to make informed investment 
decisions.”23 One year later, Congress enacted the Foreign Cor-
rupt Practices Act of 1977,24 prohibiting bribery of foreign offi-
cials and requiring accounting transparency. The United States 
led the charge internationally. In fact, it wasn’t until 1997—
twenty years later—that nations of the Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development (OECD) joined in signing 
an Anti-Bribery Convention.25
 
 23. SEC, 94TH CONG., REP. TO THE S. COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING & 
URBAN AFFAIRS ON QUESTIONABLE AND ILLEGAL CORPORATE PAYMENTS AND 
PRACTICES, at c (Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter SEC REP. TO CONG.], availa-
ble at http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/fcpa/sec-report-questionable-illegal-corp 
orate-payments-practices-1976.pdf. 
 But the push for full transparen-
 24. Pub. L. No. 95-213, §§ 101–04, 91 Stat. 1494, 1494–98 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 25. OECD, CONVENTION ON COMBATING BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OF-
FICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS AND RELATED DOCU-
MENTS (2011), available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/ConvCombat 
Bribery_ENG.pdf. Recommendations were adopted in 2009 to further combat 
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cy continued, particularly in the extraction industry where cor-
ruption has been prevalent. While the Foreign Corrupt Practic-
es Act and OECD Anti-Bribery Convention have minimized 
corrupt business practices, these laws fall far short of eliminat-
ing the corrupt practices of foreign governments. Companies 
may be prohibited from making improper payments, or 
“bribes,”26
A. THE GLOBAL CAMPAIGN FOR TRANSPARENCY 
 to government officials, but nothing prevents a gov-
ernment from collecting similar payments in the form of licens-
es, permits, or other legal mechanisms—different means, same 
illegitimate ends. 
In 1999, the human rights watchdog Global Witness27 
called on oil companies operating in Angola to develop policies 
of full transparency, requesting that they publish all payments 
made, including payments for what it describes as “dubious so-
cial projects,” and to clarify exact relationships with the gov-
ernment.28 It brought to light the industry’s contribution to the 
plundering of state assets during a decades-long civil war and 
its complicity in the government’s failure to address human de-
velopment needs.29
 
bribery of foreign officials. Id. at 20. For more information about the OECD, 
see About the OECD, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/about (last visited Apr. 22, 
2014). 
 Despite its position as Africa’s second larg-
est oil producer, the United Nations (UN) Human Development 
Index—which measures development by combining indicators 
of life expectancy, education, income—ranked Angola 160 out of 
174 countries. Eighty-two percent of Angola’s population was 
living in absolute poverty, fifty-nine percent without access to 
drinking water, and thirteen percent afflicted with severe mal-
 26. See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 § 103, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1. 
 27. Global Witness runs campaigns against natural resource-related con-
flict and corruption and related human rights and environmental violations. 
Our Work, GLOBAL WITNESS, http://www.globalwitness.org/ (last visited Apr. 
22, 2014). In 2003, Global Witness was co-nominated for a Nobel Peace Prize 
for its work campaigning against conflict diamonds. Conflict Diamonds, 
GLOBAL WITNESS, http://www.globalwitness.org/campaigns/conflict/conflict 
-diamonds (last visited Apr. 22, 2014). 
 28. GLOBAL WITNESS, A CRUDE AWAKENING 1–3, 13 (1999), available at 
http://www.globalwitness.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/A%20Crude%20 
Awakening.pdf. “Dubious projects” include upgrading houses and overseas 
scholarships. Id. at 3, 13. Global Witness additionally highlights the need to 
publish all payments in a format that is easy for the Angolan population to 
understand. Id. at 13. 
 29. Id. at 21. 
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nutrition.30 Yet it was estimated that the extraction industry 
was contributing $1.8–$3 billion annually to the Angola state 
income, and revenue was projected to grow substantially over 
the next decade.31
Angola was, and still is, an example of a country that is 
plagued by what is commonly referred to as the “resource 
curse”—the notion that countries rich in natural resources are 
often fraught with mismanagement of revenues, corruption, 
economic instability, and conflict.
 
32 Global Witness’s 1999 expo-
sé on Angola gained international attention from which the 
Publish What You Pay Coalition was born—a campaign for the 
disclosure of payments and expenditures in research-rich coun-
tries around the world.33 Since its inception in 2002 as a small, 
primarily UK-based coalition, Publish What You Pay has 
grown to include membership organizations in over sixty coun-
tries.34
Acting on the Publish What You Pay campaign, UK Prime 
Minister Tony Blair announced the launch of the EITI at the 
2002 Sustainable Development Summit in Johannesburg.
  
35 The 
international political initiative encouraged governments of re-
source-rich countries, extractive companies, NGOs, and other 
interested parties to develop a framework to promote disclosure 
of payments and revenues.36
 
 30. Id. at 1, 4. 
 In its simplest form, the EITI re-
quires reporting, verification, and reconciliation of payments 
 31. Id. at 6; see also Angola: IMF Should Insist on Audit, HUMAN RTS. 
WATCH (July 11, 2012), http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/07/11/angola-imf 
-should-insist-audit (calling for an explanation of how Angola spent more than 
$41.8 billion in unaccounted for oil revenues from 2007 to 2011); HUMAN 
RIGHTS WATCH, TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN ANGOLA: AN UPDATE 
11 (2010), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/angola04 
10webwcover_1.pdf (“The 2010 [U.S. Senate’s Permanent Subcommittee on 
Investigations] report underscored how oil revenue has fueled corruption and 
mismanagement in Angola . . . .”). 
 32. See Paul Stevens, Resource Curse, ENCYCLOPEDIA EARTH (Aug. 22, 
2008, 4:51 PM), http://www.eoearth.org/view/article/155721/. 
 33. History, PUBLISH WHAT YOU PAY, http://www.publishwhatyoupay.org/ 
about/history (last visited Apr. 22, 2014). The scope of the Publish What You 
Pay campaign has evolved to include transparency in government expendi-
tures (“publish what you spend”) and licensing procedures (“publish what you 
don’t pay/should pay”). Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. EITI, STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES AND AGREED ACTIONS (2003), avail-
able at http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.dfid.gov.uk/ 
pubs/files/eitidraftreportstatement.pdf. 
  
2442 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [98:2435 
 
made by extraction companies and received by governments.37 
The EITI seeks to strengthen accountability and good govern-
ance, empowering citizens with information and stimulating 
foreign investment by demonstrating commitment to transpar-
ency.38
In 2013, thirty-seven countries were implementing EITI, 
twenty-five of which were meeting all of the requirements of 
the EITI standard, including Africa’s largest oil producer, Nige-
ria.
 
39 Nigeria launched its initiative in 2004, becoming the first 
African country to follow the EITI standard.40 In 2009, the gov-
ernment of Nigeria released its second audit, reporting an over 
$800 million government shortfall in taxes, royalties, and sign-
ing bonuses that companies reported paying.41 Nigeria has long 
been considered one of the most corrupt countries in the world. 
Transparency International ranked it 37th most corrupt in 
2012.42 But implementation of the EITI “cracked open” the ex-
traction industry and exposed the intricate details of corrup-
tion.43
B. THE GLOBAL CAMPAIGN FOR TRANSPARENCY TAKES ROOT IN 
THE UNITED STATES 
 While disclosure alone will not create change, the infor-
mation has allowed both international and state attention to 
focus more effectively on ensuring that society benefits from re-
source wealth.  
By 2005, the Publish What You Pay campaign in the Unit-
ed States was working with members of Congress to strengthen 
transparency initiatives, laying the foundation for what would 
become the Cardin-Lugar Amendment in 2010.44
 
 37. What Is the EITI?, EITI, http://eiti.org/eiti (last visited Apr. 22, 2014). 
 The disclosure 
rules were first introduced in 2008 by Representative Barney 
 38. Benefits from Implementing EITI, EITI, http://eiti.org/eiti/benefits 
(last visited Apr. 22, 2014). 
 39. EITI Countries, EITI, http://eiti.org/countries (last visited Apr. 22, 
2014). 
 40. EITI, NIGERIA EITI: MAKING TRANSPARENCY COUNT, UNCOVERING 
BILLIONS 1 (2012) [hereinafter NIGERIA EITI], available at http://eiti.org/ 
files/Case%20Study%20-%20EITI%20in%20Nigeria.pdf.  
 41. Id. at 2. This amount exceeded the individual budgets for the Minis-
tries of Education, Health, and Power. Id.  
 42. Corruption by Country / Territory: Nigeria, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, 
http://www.transparency.org/country#NGA_DataResearch (last visited Apr. 
22, 2014). 
 43. NIGERIA EITI, supra note 40, at 3.  
 44. Our Activities U.S., PUBLISH WHAT YOU PAY U.S., http://www 
.pwypusa.org/our-activities/us (last visited Apr. 22, 2014). 
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Frank and Senator Charles Schumer as the Extractive Indus-
tries Transparency Disclosure Act.45 While the Act was not 
passed, it was reintroduced by Senator Schumer along with 
Senators Ben Cardin and Richard Lugar as the Energy Securi-
ty Through Transparency Act of 2009.46 The sponsors claimed 
that disclosure would lead to better governance which would, in 
turn, result in strengthened U.S. energy security and national 
security.47 When the Dodd-Frank Act opened for debate, Sena-
tors Cardin and Lugar introduced the Energy Security Through 
Transparency Act as an amendment, which was adopted as sec-
tion 1504 and became law in July 2010.48 In 2011, President 
Obama demonstrated further commitment to transparency by 
announcing that the United States would also implement the 
EITI, becoming only the second OECD nation to join.49
Section 1504 of Dodd-Frank added section 13(q) to the Ex-
change Act, directing the SEC to issue final rules requiring re-
source extraction companies
  
50 to include in their annual report 
any payment—including taxes, royalties, fees, bonuses, and 
other “not de minimis” benefits commonly recognized in com-
mercial resource development—made to a foreign government 
by the issuer, subsidiary, or entity under their control.51 Addi-
tionally, the statute requires that companies disclose payments 
according to type and total amount for each “project” and each 
government and that they submit all information in an interac-
tive data format, which includes electronic tags to mark speci-
fied information.52 Finally, the SEC, “[t]o the extent practica-
ble, . . . [was to] make available online, to the public, a 
compilation of the information required to be submitted under 
the rules.”53 The SEC received and considered over 150 unique 
comment letters and over 149,000 form letters.54
 
 45. H.R. 6066, S. 3389, 110th Cong. (2008); Our Activities U.S., supra note 
 It extended 
44. 
 46. S. 1700, 111th Cong. (2009); Our Activities U.S., supra note 44. 
 47. S. 1700 § 2. 
 48. Our Activities U.S., supra note 44. 
 49. President Obama: The U.S. Will Implement the EITI, EITI (Sept. 20, 
2011, 8:15 PM), http://eiti.org/news-events/president-obama-us-will-implement 
-eiti. Norway was the first OECD nation to join the EITI. Id. 
 50. “[R]esource extraction issuer” refers to a company that “engages in the 
commercial development of oil, natural gas, or minerals.” Dodd-Frank § 1504, 
15 U.S.C. § 78m(q)(1)(D)(ii) (2012). 
 51. Id. § 78m(q)(1)(C). 
 52. Id. § 78m(q)(2). 
 53. Id. § 78m(q)(3). 
 54. Comments on Proposed Rule: Disclosure of Payments by Resource Ex-
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the comment period at the request of commentators and de-
layed issuing the final rule until 493 days after the deadline 
imposed by statute.55
In its 232-page final rule, issued on August 22, 2012, the 
SEC dealt a surprising blow to industry groups opposed to the 
rule. The SEC defined “not de minimis” as any payment or se-
ries of related payments that equals or exceeds $100,000, as 
opposed to a $1 million threshold urged by some in industry or 
a definition based on materiality as suggested by others.
  
56 De-
spite strong pressure to define “project,” the SEC left the term 
undefined, noting generally that the contract should serve as 
the basis for definition57 and rejecting definitions proposed by 
industry as inconsistent with Congress’s intent for transparen-
cy.58 The SEC refused to grant exemptions for commercially 
sensitive information or for those operating in countries which 
prohibit disclosure.59 And the SEC was not persuaded by com-
menters that Congress intended companies to submit payment 
disclosures confidentially to the SEC and for the public to only 
have access to the aggregate data.60 While the statute does not 
define “compilation” as it relates to public availability of infor-
mation, the SEC concluded that all payment disclosures re-
quired by the rule will be made available online.61
The SEC estimated the total initial cost of compliance for 
all companies at approximately $1 billion and ongoing costs be-
tween $200 million and $400 million annually.
  
62
 
traction Issuers, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-42-10/s74210.shtml 
(last visited Apr. 22, 2014). All form letters and the large majority of unique 
letters were in support of the rules, requesting that the SEC follow the lan-
guage of section 1504 and not give in to industry pressure for exemptions. Id. 
 While Con-
gress intended the rules to improve accountability and govern-
ance in resource-rich countries, the SEC noted that such social 
 55. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
 56. Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers, 77 Fed. Reg. 
56,365, 56,381–83 & n.234 (Sept. 12, 2012) (originally codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 
240, 249). This threshold exceeded that urged by some commentators. Id. at 
56,381–82. 
 57. Id. at 56,406. 
 58. Id. (rejecting industry pressure to define “project” at the country level, 
as reporting unit, in relation to a particular geological basin or mineral dis-
trict, or by reference to materiality standard consistent with federal securities 
laws). 
 59. Id. at 56,368. 
 60. Id. at 56,391. 
 61. Id. at 56,390–94. 
 62. Id. at 56,398. 
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benefits could not be readily quantified with any precision.63 
Additionally, the SEC made clear that such objectives would 
not necessarily generate direct economic benefits to investors or 
issuers, but may “materially and substantially improve invest-
ment decision making.”64
C. INDUSTRY RESPONDS 
 
On October 10, 2012, the API, the U.S. Chamber of Com-
merce, the Independent Petroleum Association of America, and 
the National Foreign Trade Council filed a lawsuit against the 
SEC in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.65 
The industry groups alleged that section 1504 and the SEC rule 
requiring disclosure violate the First Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution by forcing U.S. companies to unnecessarily engage 
in speech that discloses sensitive and confidential infor-
mation.66 Additionally, they alleged that the SEC violated the 
APA and Exchange Act by acting arbitrarily and capriciously in 
(1) declining to allow confidential reporting;67 (2) failing to de-
fine “project” as a geologic basin or province;68 (3) denying an 
exemption in cases where foreign law prohibits disclosure;69 (4) 
disregarding the Exchange Act which prohibits “impos[ing] . . . 
burden[s] on competition not necessary or appropriate”;70 (5) 
conducting insufficient evaluation of costs and benefits;71 and 
(6) failing to solicit additional comments after releasing a 
flawed cost-benefit analysis in the final rule.72 In sum, the in-
dustry groups argued that the SEC “grossly misinterpreted its 
statutory mandate,”73
 
 63. Id. 
 forcing companies to publicly disclose 
more than Congress required, and acted outside its statutory 
authority in issuing rules which imposed high costs—not only 
 64. Id.; see also Letter from 58 Members of Congress to Mary L. Schapiro, 
Chairman, SEC (June 22, 2012), available at http://democrats.natural 
resources.house.gov/sites/democrats.naturalresources.house.gov/files/ 
documents/2012-06-22_SEC_ChairmanSchapiro_ProtectPowerless.pdf (noting 
that the rule “will also provide material information for investors to reduce 
their risk and increase the choices of ethical investment”). 
 65. Complaint, supra note 15. 
 66. Id. at 28. 
 67. Id. at 30–31. 
 68. Id. at 31–32. 
 69. Id. at 32–33. 
 70. Id. at 34 (quoting 15 U.S.C. 78w(a)(2) (2012)); see id. at 34–35. 
 71. Id. at 35–36. 
 72. Id. at 36–37. 
 73. Id. at 3. 
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in reporting, but in business lost to competitors outside the 
SEC’s reach74—and with no quantified benefits.75
Senators Cardin and Lugar refuted the industry groups’ 
claim of gross misinterpretation by the SEC.
  
76 Following the 
court filing, Senator Lugar stated, “[t]he benefits will not be re-
alized if investments serve to entrench authoritarianism, cor-
ruption and instability.”77 Senator Cardin noted that 
“[i]ncreased transparency will not put companies that comply 
at a competitive disadvantage but will reduce the risks for U.S. 
investors” and referred to the rule as “carefully crafted,” “rea-
sonable,” and “very manageable.”78
D. MANDATORY DISCLOSURE RULES GAIN SUPPORT OUTSIDE 
THE UNITED STATES 
  
Just one month after the SEC announced the final rule, the 
EU began garnering support for its own disclosure rule—one 
that extends beyond the extraction industry to logging, bank-
ing, construction, and telecommunications.79
 
 74. State-owned issuers hold the majority of the world’s oil reserves and 
produce the majority of the world’s supply. Branden Carl Berns, Note, Will Oil 
and Gas Issuers Leave U.S. Equity Markets in Response to Section 1504 of the 
Dodd-Frank Act? Can They Afford Not To?, 2011 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 758, 
765.  
 Before the court 
 75. Complaint, supra note 15; see Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(f), 
15 U.S.C. § 78c(f) (requiring the SEC to consider whether the rule “will pro-
mote efficiency, competition, and capital formation”). 
 76. Jim Snyder, Senators Contradict Oil Industry’s Challenge of SEC 
Rules, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Oct. 11, 2012, 2:18 PM), http://www.bloomberg 
.com/news/2012-10-11/senators-contradict-oil-industry-s-challenge-of-sec-rules 
.html.  
 77. Id.  
 78. Press Release, Ben Cardin, U.S. Senator for Md., Cardin, Lugar Re-
spond to Big Oil Challenge to Transparency Regulations (Oct. 11, 2012), 
available at http://www.cardin.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/cardin 
-lugar-respond-to-big-oil-challenge-to-transparency-regulations. 
 79. Rep. of the European Parliament Comm. on Legal Affairs on the Pro-
posal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council Amending 
Directive 2004/109/EC on the Harmonization of Transparency Requirements 
in Relation to Information About Issuers Whose Securities Are Admitted to 
Trading on a Regulated Market and Commission Directive 2007/14/EC, at 7, 
Doc. A7-0292/2012 (Sept. 27, 2012) [hereinafter EU Disclosure Proposal], 
available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=//EP// 
NONSGML+REPORT+A7-2012-0292+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN; James O. Green 
et al., EU Parliamentary Committee Backs Tough Disclosure Rules for Extrac-
tive Companies, LEGAL INSIGHT (K&L Gates, Pittsburgh, Pa.), Oct. 3, 2012, 
available at http://m.klgates.com/files/Publication/aa7765f1-7efa-494d-a7b1 
-0065a2da6108/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/bf155e6c-de25-4c56-9c48 
-05b02346202f/EU_Committee_backs_Tough_Disclosure_Rules_for_ 
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rendered its decision, the EU Parliament voted in favor of new 
EU Transparency and Accounting Directives which require re-
source extraction companies with securities traded on a regu-
lated market to disclose payments to national governments on 
a project-by-project level with no exemption for companies op-
erating in countries which bar disclosure.80 Combined, the U.S. 
and EU disclosure rules will cover over ninety percent of the 
extraction industry, while the EITI will continue to cover large 
state-owned companies in the countries implementing the 
EITI.81 In addition, efforts to increase transparency have begun 
in Australia, Hong Kong, and Canada.82 At the G8 meeting in 
June 2013, Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper an-
nounced Canada’s commitment to mandate disclosure in the 
extraction industry.83
 
Extractive_Companies.pdf; Press Release, European Parliament Comm. on 
Legal Affairs, Oil, Gas and Diamond Companies Could Be Forced to Fully Dis-
close Payments to Governments (Sept. 18, 2012), available at http://www 
.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/content/20120917IPR51496/html/ 
Extractive-companies-could-be-forced-to-fully-disclose-payments. The proposal 
requires project-level reporting of all payments—including multiple related 
payments—equal to or greater than €80,000 euros ($105,100), which is on par 
with the U.S. rules. UK Back Tough Oil, Gas Anti-Corruption Law, REUTERS 
(Oct. 11, 2012, 1:49 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/11/britain-
industry-mining-idUSL1E8LBC7P20121011. 
 Prior to that, the two largest Canadian 
 80. See Minutes of the Sitting of 12 June 2013, 2013 O.J. (C 253 E) 142, 
154, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri= 
OJ:C:2013:253E:FULL&from=EN (voting on Transparency Requirements in 
Relation to Information About Issuers Whose Securities Are Admitted to Trad-
ing on a Regulated Market, P7_TA(2013)0262 (2013), available at http:// 
www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/acp/dv/p7_ta-prov% 
282013%290262_/p7_ta-prov%282013%290262_en.pdf).  
 81. Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers, 75 Fed. Reg. 
80,978, 80,980 n.39 (proposed Dec. 23, 2010) (originally to be codified at 17 
C.F.R. pts. 229, 249) (stating that the rule applies to “90 percent of the major 
internationally operating oil companies and 8 out of the 10 largest mining 
companies in the world” and that twenty out of the top fifty oil and gas com-
panies by proven reserves do not operate internationally and do not compete 
with international companies); EITI, EITI RULES, 2011 EDITION 21 (Sam Bart-
lett & Kjerstin Andreasen eds., 2011) [hereinafter EITI RULES], available at 
http://eiti.org/files/2011-11-01_2011_EITI_RULES.pdf (stating that the rule 
applies to all companies—both public and private). 
 82. See Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers, 77 Fed. 
Reg. 56,365, 56,403 (Sept. 12, 2012) (originally codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 
249); Nick Cunningham, From the Lawyer: SEC Actions Dodd-Frank Disclo-
sure Requirements for ‘Resource Extraction Issuers’, BREAKING ENERGY (Sept. 
11, 2012, 12:00 PM), http://breakingenergy.com/2012/09/11/from-the-lawyers 
-sec-actions-dodd-frank-disclosure-requirements/. 
 83. Harper Announces New Transparency Rules for Energy, Mining, CBC 
NEWS (June 12, 2013, 7:33 AM), http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/harper 
-announces-new-transparency-rules-for-energy-mining-1.1305236. 
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mining industry associations announced collaboration with 
Publish What You Pay–Canada to create a new framework for 
disclosure of payments to foreign governments by Canadian oil 
and mining companies, which currently operate in over 100 
countries.84 The Canadian mining industry is not alone in its 
support for transparency rules. Norwegian oil and gas producer 
Statoil openly rejected the lawsuit brought by the API, stating 
that reporting is not an impediment to doing business.85
E. DISCLOSURE RULES EXPAND BEYOND THE EXTRACTION 
INDUSTRY 
  
Mandating disclosure of extraction industry payments to 
foreign governments is just one part of the growing movement 
for legislating transparency and corporate social responsibility, 
more generally. In addition to addressing the resource curse, 
Congress, through Dodd-Frank section 1502, sought to crack 
down on the use of “conflict minerals” used to finance violence 
in the Democratic Republic of Congo and other areas in central 
Africa.86 Section 1502 required the SEC to promulgate rules 
mandating that companies disclose whether their products con-
tain defined materials, including tantalum, tin, gold, or tung-
sten, from the Democratic Republic of Congo or an adjoining 
country and what measures companies have taken to exercise 
due diligence through their supply chain.87
 
 84. Andrew Bauer, RWI, Canadian Mining Industry Working to Improve 
Transparency, REVENUE WATCH INST. (Sept. 6, 2012, 10:34), http:// 
www.revenuewatch.org/news/blog/rwi-canadian-mining-industry-working 
-improve-transparency. For more details on the collaboration, see Memoran-
dum of Understanding Between Mining Assoc. of Can.; Prospectors and Devel-
opers Assoc. of Can.; Publish What You Pay–Canada; The Revenue Watch 
Inst.; (July 11, 2012), available at http://www.revenuewatch.org/sites/default/ 
files/Final%20Signed%20Canada%20MoU%20-%20July%2025%202012.pdf.  
 In January 2012, 
the California Transparency in Supply Chains Act took effect, 
 85. Press Release, Revenue Watch Inst., Statoil Withholds Support from 
Lawsuit Against Transparency; Dutch Government Pledges Support for EU 
Transparency, Resisting Pressure from Shell (Feb. 8, 2013), available at 
http://www.revenuewatch.org/news/press_releases/statoil-withholds-support 
-lawsuit-against-transparency-dutch-government-pledges-. 
 86. Media Note, U.S. Dep’t of State, Final Rules for Dodd-Frank Sections 
1502 and 1504 (Aug. 23, 2012), available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ 
ps/2012/08/196882.htm.  
 87. Dodd-Frank § 1502, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(p) (2012). This rule was also met 
with a legal challenge. See Christopher M. Matthews, Business Groups Fully 
Brief “Conflict Minerals” Legal Challenge, WALL ST. J. BLOGS (Jan. 17, 2013, 
4:28 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/corruption-currents/2013/01/17/business-groups 
-fully-brief-conflict-minerals-legal-challenge/. 
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requiring retailers and manufacturers doing business in Cali-
fornia to disclose their efforts to eradicate human trafficking 
and slavery from their supply chains.88 Additionally, the U.S. 
State Department is currently considering strategies for im-
plementing the Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights, adopted by the UN Human Rights Council in 2011, in 
effort to articulate the obligations of states and business enti-
ties under international law.89
The Guiding Principles seem to be playing a particularly 
important role in increasing corporate transparency. In addi-
tion to developing sector-specific guidance for implementation 
of the Guiding Principles,
  
90 in February 2014, the European 
Commission announced that certain large companies would be 
required to “disclose information on policies, risks and results 
as regards environmental matters, social and employee-related 
aspects, respect for human rights, [and] anti-corruption and 
bribery issues.”91
The United States has not yet taken this step, but there is 
a clear trend toward increased government oversight and a 
public demand for transparency.
 
92
 
 88. California Transparency in Supply Chains Act of 2010, ch. 556, 2010 
Cal. Stat. 2641 (codified at CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.43 (2014) and CAL. REV. & 
TAX CODE § 19547.5 (2014)) (relating to human trafficking). In 2011, a bill 
modeled after the California law was introduced in Congress, but effectively 
died in committee. See Business Transparency on Trafficking and Slavery Act, 
H.R. 2759, 112th Cong. (2011). 
 There may be disagreement 
 89. See Guiding Principles, supra note 10. 
 90. See, e.g., EUROPEAN COMM’N, OIL AND GAS SECTOR GUIDE ON IMPLE-
MENTING THE UN GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
(2013), http://www.ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/sustainablebusiness/files/ 
csr-sme/csr-oag-hr-business_en.pdf. 
 91. Press Release, European Comm’n, Disclosure of Non-Financial Infor-
mation by Certain Large Companies: European Parliament and Council Reach 
Agreement on Commission Proposal to Improve Transparency (Feb. 26, 2014), 
available at http://www.europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-14-29_ 
en.htm?locale=en. The directive will apply to “[l]arge public-interest entities 
(mainly listed companies and financial institutions) with more than 500 em-
ployees.” Id. 
 92. The demand for public transparency may also be observed in the 
growing trend toward sustainable and responsible investing (SRI). Since 1995, 
the growth in total dollars under professional management outpaced the over-
all market, and the longest-running SRI index has performed competitively 
with the S&P 500. Performance & SRI, F. FOR SUSTAINABLE & RESPONSIBLE 
INVESTMENT, http://www.ussif.org/performance (last visited Apr. 22, 2014). 
Organizations such as the International Corporate Accountability Roundtable 
and projects such as Shift—which helps governments and businesses imple-
ment the Guiding Principles—also play a prominent role in driving the mo-
mentum for increased corporate social responsibility. See INT’L CORP. AC-
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over whether the SEC is the appropriate body to regulate social 
disclosure in general,93 but regulating disclosure of financial in-
formation is well within the SEC’s purview and there is a 
strong argument that the SEC has the statutory authority to 
mandate disclosure for public interest, so long as it is not the 
sole purpose of the disclosure.94
Failure to move forward with disclosure mandates in the 
extraction industry—the industry at the heart of corruption in 
much of the developing world—would be an enormous step 
back in the campaign for transparency. If we cannot demand 
transparency from this industry, from whom can we demand it? 
This landmark legislation marks a critical milestone for U.S. 
corporate transparency. The law must be defended and its im-
plementation must serve as a model for new regulatory 
measures aimed at expanding social disclosure.  
 
II.  DEFENDING THE RULE: THE NEED, THE MANDATE, 
SEC ACTION, WHY INDUSTRY CHALLENGES FALL 
SHORT, AND HOW IT FITS WITHIN A BROADENING 
INTERNATIONAL EFFORT   
Congress intended the disclosure rule to address a social 
problem and was fully aware of the EITI—its value as well as 
its shortcomings—when it enacted section 1504. It clearly 
sought a rule that would expand the scope of the EITI and, im-
portantly, mandate what the EITI has been unable to.95
 
COUNTABILITY ROUNDTABLE, http://www.accountabilityroundtable.org/ (last 
visited Apr. 22, 2014); SHIFT, http://www.shiftproject.org/ (last visited Apr. 22, 
2014). In addition to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-
213, §§ 101–04, 91 Stat. 1494, 1494–98 (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 15 U.S.C.), the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 is an example of increased 
U.S. government oversight to address corrupt business practices. See Pub. L. 
No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 
U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 29 U.S.C.) (addressing major corporate ac-
counting scandals including Enron and Global Crossing). 
 Moreo-
 93. See Interview with Richard W. Painter, S. Walter Richey Professor of 
Corporate Law, Univ. of Minn. Law Sch. (Oct. 28, 2013) (noting that the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency, U.S. Department of Labor, U.S. Depart-
ment of State, or others are likely in a better position to regulate disclosure for 
purely social ends, including environmental pollution and labor issues, which 
involve substantially more than disclosure of financial transactions). 
 94. See Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission 
and Corporate Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1235–46 (1999). 
Williams notes that this is a “proxy” power “limited by the social goals under-
lying the [securities] acts.” Id. at 1271–72.  
 95. Compare Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers, 77 
Fed. Reg. 56,365, 56,368 (Sept. 12, 2012) (originally codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 
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ver, it appeared to provide very little discretion to the SEC or 
opportunity for the SEC to frustrate its intent.96 Nonetheless, 
the court found there was room for interpretation and thus the 
SEC must now reconsider whether or not its interpretation was 
appropriate.97
This section discusses the weaknesses of the EITI, the con-
gressional mandate to the SEC, the SEC’s obligations under 
the Exchange Act, judicial review under the APA, and the need 
for a model for social disclosure expansion. 
  
A. EITI FALLS SHORT  
While industry has argued that the EITI meets congres-
sional goals for transparency, the initiative has two critical 
shortcomings. First, as a voluntary program, the EITI operates 
only in countries that have accepted its requirements98 and are 
meeting its standard.99 Second, the EITI’s flexible reporting 
methodology results in inconsistent levels of disclosure.100
 
240, 249) (requiring an annual report of disclosures within a year of imple-
mentation), with EITI RULES, supra note 
 At 
the low end, EITI disclosure falls severely short of the disclo-
81, at 19 (stating that countries have 
eighteen months to publish an EITI report and two and a half years to submit 
a final validation report which may or may not include disaggregated pay-
ments). 
 96. See Brief for Representatives Edward J. Markey et al. as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Respondents at 4, Am. Petroleum Inst. v. SEC, 714 F.3d 1329 
(D.C. Cir. 2013) (No. 12-1398), 2013 WL 179895, at *4 [hereinafter Brief Sup-
porting Respondents] (“Here, the Commission was following such an explicit, 
detailed congressional mandate; section 1504 laid out the precise contours that 
the Resource Extraction Rule must have, and the Commission followed those 
dictates to the letter.”). 
 97. See Am. Petroleum Inst. v. SEC, 953 F. Supp. 2d 5, 13 (D.D.C. 2013) 
(finding that the Commission erred in finding that Congress “has directly spo-
ken to the precise question at issue,” and that under Chevron’s second prong, 
deference to the agency is “only appropriate when the agency has exercised its 
own judgment”). 
 98. As of November 2013, thirty-seven countries were implementing EITI, 
yet Shell operated in over eighty countries and Total operated in over 130. See 
A Leading Global Energy Company, TOTAL, http://total.com/en/about 
-total/thumbnail (last visited Apr. 22, 2014); EITI Countries, supra note 39; 
Shell at a Glance, SHELL GLOBAL, http://www.shell.com/global/aboutshell/at-a 
-glance.html (last visited Apr. 22, 2014). 
 99. How Countries Can Implement the EITI Standard, EITI, http://eiti 
.org/eiti/implementation (last visited Apr. 22, 2014) (outlining the process for 
becoming an EITI candidate and reaching EITI compliant status). 
 100. EITI RULES, supra note 81, at 12 (“The guidance is limited given that 
the EITI is a robust, but flexible standard, and national stakeholders are to 
adapt it to local needs and context.”). 
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sure rules adopted by Congress.101 At its best, it serves to com-
pliment the U.S. rule by minimizing the negative impact on 
competition and providing a platform for extending transparen-
cy standards toward initiatives that effect the positive change 
the EITI seeks—better governance and promotion of human 
rights.102
1. Voluntary Nature and Flexible Reporting Undermine the 
EITI’s Objectives 
  
Because it is voluntary, it is not surprising that countries 
such as Angola, which are at the heart of the EITI movement, 
have failed to join.103 Although membership is growing, there 
are currently only forty-one member states, twenty-five of 
which are meeting all requirements of the EITI standard, and 
four of which have had their status suspended.104
The EITI governing board—comprised of representatives 
from government, industry, and civil society—sets the mini-
mum standards for implementation, which are published in the 
EITI Rules.
  
105
 
 101. Id. at 11 (noting that requirements are minimal and states are en-
couraged to expand). 
 Unlike the U.S. disclosure rules, EITI standards 
are meant to provide flexibility to member countries—they es-
tablish a mechanism for transparency, but it is up to the mem-
 102. The final challenge will be translating disclosure to a positive change 
in the lives of the many untouched by the resource wealth of their country. 
With new data made available through U.S. and EU disclosure rules, perhaps 
the EITI can focus more on verification and expand its scope to include direct 
impact on the conditions it seeks to change. See Jean Claude Katende, The 
New Challenge for EITI: Becoming a Tool for Improving the Living Conditions 
of Poor Populations, PUBLISH WHAT YOU PAY (Dec. 4, 2012), http://www 
.publishwhatyoupay.org/resources/new-challenge-eiti-becoming-tool-improving 
-living-conditions-poor-populations (calling for a new mechanism of evaluation 
that considers the changes, such as the impact on the lives of poor populations, 
brought about by the implementation of the EITI).  
 103. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 31, at 22 (noting that the Angola 
government has repeatedly rejected the EITI and there is no external pressure 
to join); EITI Countries, supra note 39. The Human Rights Watch report also 
notes that World Bank officials had informed Human Rights Watch that Ango-
la already exceeded EITI’s requirements. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 
31, at 22. 
 104. From Transparency to Accountability, WORLD BANK (Dec. 19, 2013), 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2013/12/19/from-transparency 
-to-accountability. Countries that are not EITI compliant have not yet under-
gone the validation process, or have, but failed to meet the EITI criteria. 
Countries have eighteen months to publish an EITI report and two and a half 
years to submit a final validation report. EITI RULES, supra note 81, at 19. 
 105. EITI RULES, supra note 81, at 9. 
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ber countries to implement that mechanism in a manner that 
best meets their needs.106 These decisions are not made by state 
governments, but by multi-stakeholder groups comprised of in-
dustry, government, and NGOs within each country.107 There 
are some obligations that are non-negotiable. Under the EITI, 
governments must publish “all material oil, gas and mining 
payments to government” and “all material revenues received 
by governments from oil, gas and mining companies.”108 The 
EITI criteria leave it to member multi-stakeholder groups, 
however, to determine the threshold for “materiality.”109 Addi-
tionally, the EITI criteria currently place no requirement on 
how information is reported or published.110 While a growing 
number of EITI reports include information that is disaggre-
gated by company and/or revenue stream, some states continue 
to publish composite data only, sometimes years after the pay-
ments have been made.111 Furthermore, unlike the SEC rule, 
which requires project-level reporting, EITI still largely em-
ploys public reporting at the country-level,112
 
 106. See supra note 
 which is far less 
valuable. Because projects vary significantly in scope, geologic 
location, and risk, project-level reporting provides the trans-
parency needed for citizens to hold their local or provincial gov-
ernments accountable. This is particularly important in coun-
tries where revenues are distributed to the locales in which the 
100 and accompanying text. 
 107. EITI RULES, supra note 81, at 13, 15. 
 108. Id. at 21. According to the EITI Rules, certain revenue streams should 
be included: the host government’s production entitlement, national state-
owned company production entitlement, profits taxes, royalties, dividends, bo-
nuses, license fees, and rental fees. Id. 
 109. Id. (stating that the multi-stakeholder group must agree on the defini-
tion and the reporting templates). 
 110. See id. (stating that the multi-stakeholder group is responsible for de-
veloping reporting templates to define which revenue streams are to be in-
cluded and the time periods covered by the reporting); see also ANWAR RAVAT 
& ANDRE UFER, TOWARD STRENGTHENED EITI REPORTING: SUMMARY REPORT 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS 4–7, 20–21 (2010) (noting EITI implementation is-
sues include detailed reporting versus aggregate reporting and delay and diffi-
culty in obtaining data to the degree that there is little value in producing 
EITI reports).  
 111. Diarmid O’Sullivan, The EITI Needs to Become More Ambitious and 
More Realistic, EITI (Sept. 27, 2012, 3:28 PM), http://eiti.org/blog/eiti-needs 
-become-more-ambitious-and-more-realistic#. 
 112. But see Clare Short, Building on Achievement: A Proposal to Improve 
the EITI, by Making the EITI Reports Better, Implementation Simpler, and the 
EITI a Stronger Platform for Wider Reforms 7–8 (EITI, Board Paper No. 21-2-
A, 2012) (noting the emerging consensus that reporting standards should come 
in line with U.S. rules of company-by-company reporting). 
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operations are located. Additionally, project-level reporting 
provides the level of detail investors need to evaluate risk, 
which is critical in regions marred by instability.  
While the SEC did not define “project,” it provided very 
specific guidance on what the term could and could not in-
clude.113 Industry objected to this, arguing that the SEC’s gran-
ular notion of project is costly and unnecessary.114 But their ob-
jection is belied by the fact that some large companies 
committed to corporate social responsibility already voluntarily 
publish revenue for certain projects, including Newmont and 
Statoil, two of the world’s leading extraction companies.115 Ad-
ditionally, several countries have developed project-level re-
porting templates through the EITI with some success, includ-
ing Indonesia, Zambia, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Timor-Leste.116
2. While Insufficient on Its Own, the EITI Adds Value to the 
U.S. Disclosure Rule 
  
One area of strength which the EITI has and the U.S. rule 
does not, and cannot, is the ability to create a level playing 
field.117 Although EITI rules vary by country, their application 
is consistent within each country: they apply to all issuers 
alike, whether publicly-traded or state-owned, and thus are less 
likely to provide a competitive advantage or disadvantage. The 
SEC did not disregard the potentially large impact compliance 
will have on competition, but this was overshadowed by the 
fundamental failure of the EITI to require implementation.118
 
 113. Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers, 77 Fed. Reg. 
56,365, 56,385–86 (Sept. 12, 2012) (originally codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 
249). 
 
This is what sets the U.S. rule apart from the EITI and why the 
 114. Complaint, supra note 15, at 6. 
 115. REVENUE WATCH INST., PROJECT-BY-PROJECT REPORTING THROUGH 
THE EITI 2 (2012), available at http://eiti.org/files/SWG/RWI_SWG_Paper_ 
Project_level_reporting_April_2012.pdf. Transparency International gave 
Statoil its highest score in corporate transparency. See TRANSPARENCY INT’L, 
TRANSPARENCY IN CORPORATE REPORTING: ASSESSING THE WORLD’S LARGEST 
COMPANIES 2 (2012), available at http://issuu.com/transparencyinternational/ 
docs/2012_transparencyincorporatereporting_en.  
 116. REVENUE WATCH INST., supra note 115. 
 117. EITI RULES, supra note 81, at 23 (“The EITI Criteria require that all 
companies—public (state-owned) and private, foreign and domestic—report 
payments . . . .”). 
 118. Senators referred to the important strides the EITI has made in pro-
moting transparency, but noted that “too many countries and too many com-
panies remain outside this voluntary system.” 156 CONG. REC. S3815 (daily 
ed. May 17, 2010) (statement of Sen. Cardin). 
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U.S. rule is important to the EITI and its ability to meet its ob-
jectives. At the same time, the EITI may complement the U.S. 
disclosure requirements by bringing companies outside the 
purview of the SEC under the regulated scrutiny of the EITI.  
Of course, some companies operating in non-EITI states 
will remain out of reach. In addition to the U.S. disclosure rule 
and proposed EU rules, support for transparency can be found 
in Hong Kong, Australia, and Canada.119 But none of these ini-
tiatives will extend to the large state-owned companies in Rus-
sia and China. For this, expansion of the EITI may be neces-
sary. Instead of opposing these initiatives, industry could use 
its power within the EITI governing board and the state-level 
multi-stakeholder groups to push uniform disclosure require-
ments. Companies and investors hold six spots on the EITI 
board of directors—equal to other major stakeholders.120 Cur-
rently, these positions are held by Chevron, Statoil, Royal 
Dutch Shell, Rio Tinto, Standard Life Investments, and Free-
port-McMoRan, Copper & Gold.121 All industry members, in-
cluding alternates, fall under the purview of the SEC and new 
U.S. disclosure rules. Industry has a voice at the negotiating 
table. With U.S. rules in place, industry will have a strong in-
terest in ensuring that everyone is playing by the same rules. 
Industry could have the most powerful voice in driving that 
charge.122
B. CONGRESS MANDATES SPECIFIED ACTION 
 The question remains whether they will use it to ob-
struct or to create a uniform standard that can bring about 
transparency and better governance throughout the resource-
rich world. 
Congress fully recognized the purpose and the shortcom-
ings of the EITI. The plain language of the statute and the leg-
islative history show that Congress intended the SEC to prom-
ulgate resource extraction disclosure rules with the same 
primary purpose—to empower citizens of resource-rich coun-
 
 119. See Cunningham, supra note 82. 
 120. EITI, MEMBERS OF THE EITI INTERNATIONAL BOARD 2011–2013, at 2 
(2012), available at http://eiti.org/files/22_10_2012_%20EITI%20Board% 
202011-2013_0.pdf. Implementing countries hold five seats, supporting coun-
tries hold three, and civil society groups hold five. Id. at 1–2. 
 121. Id. at 2. Board alternates include ExxonMobil, BP, Pemex, Interna-
tional Council on Mining and Metals, De Beers, and Allianz GI Europe. Id.  
 122. But see Extracting Oil, Burying Data, ECONOMIST, Feb. 25, 2012, at 73 
(“Some suspect that the firms on the initiative’s board sing its praises only be-
cause they can ensure it stays toothless.”). 
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tries to hold their governments accountable for the manage-
ment and appropriation of revenues generated.123 In his testi-
mony on the Senate floor, Senator Cardin stated that this 
amendment would “pierce the veil of secrecy that fosters so 
much corruption and instability in resource-rich countries.”124 
Senator Lugar added that “[d]espite $1/2 trillion in revenues 
since the 1960s, poverty has increased, corruption is rife, and 
violence roils the oil-rich Niger Delta.”125
But the call for transparency was not made solely with an 
altruistic intent to support the impoverished communities 
abroad, nor could it be under the Exchange Act.
  
126 Both Sena-
tors recognized that the promotion of good governance would 
have an additional positive impact on the United States—
improving the conditions in which the extraction industry 
works and opening up new markets that are otherwise too 
risky or unstable.127 Transparency, they said, would empower 
investors with a better view of their holdings, improve the in-
vestment climate overall, increase the reliability of commodity 
supplies, and promote energy security.128 These assertions were 
supported by calling attention to the instability in the Niger 
Delta that has already resulted in lost jobs and profits for 
American companies operating in the region.129
Congress knew what it was doing. Despite the district 
court’s finding that Congress had not clearly spoken, the level 
of detail and specificity with which the legislation was drafted 
  
 
 123. 156 CONG. REC. S3816 (statement of Sen. Richard Lugar) (“Adoption 
of the Cardin-Lugar amendment would bring a major step in favor of in-
creased transparency at home and abroad. . . . More importantly, it would help 
empower citizens to hold their governments to account . . . .”). 
 124. Id. at S3815. 
 125. Id. at S3816. 
 126. See supra note 94.  
 127. See 156 CONG. REC. S3815–16. 
 128. See id. 
  Companies in the extractive sector face unique tax and reputa-
tional risks in the form of country-specific taxes and regulations. Ex-
posure to these risks is heightened by the substantial capital em-
ployed in the extractive industries, and the often opaque and 
unaccountable management of natural resource revenues by foreign 
governments, which in turn creates unstable and high-cost operating 
environments for multinational companies. The effects of these risks 
are material to investors. 
Id. at S3816 (noting the findings of the amendment). 
 129. Id. at S3815. Senator Cardin referenced a 2009 loss of production 
reaching nearly one million barrels less than it was able to produce because of 
instability in the region. Id. 
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suggests an intent to leave little room for the SEC to render 
disclosure ineffective.  
The statute requires disclosure of any “payment” made by 
a “resource extraction issuer” to a “foreign government” (or the 
Federal Government) for “commercial development” of oil, nat-
ural gas, or minerals, including the type and total amount of 
payments made for each “project” and to each government.130 In 
defining many of these terms, Congress clearly articulated the 
level of transparency it deemed necessary to meet its objectives 
and granted very little flexibility to the SEC.131
1. No Discretion for “Commercial Development” or “Resource 
Extraction Issuer” 
  
Congress defined “commercial development” to include 
“exploration, extraction, processing, export, and other signifi-
cant actions . . . as determined by the [SEC].”132 While numer-
ous commentators suggested defining “commercial develop-
ment” in a manner consistent with the EITI which would 
include upstream activities (exploration and extraction) only, 
the SEC had only been granted discretionary authority to add 
to the list, not remove activities Congress had enumerated.133 
Proponents of the expansive definition recognize the im-
portance of disclosing payments made throughout the opera-
tion,134 particularly for transportation, given the long history of 
human rights abuses and destabilization surrounding pipeline 
transport of fuel.135
 
 130. Dodd-Frank § 1504, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(q)(2)(A) (2012). 
 
 131. See Brief Supporting Respondents, supra note 96, at 11–12 (character-
izing Representative Waters’s opening statement in the House Financial Ser-
vices Committee as speaking “only of the many things section 1504 ‘requires,’ 
providing additional evidence that Congress dictated the Resource Extraction 
Rule’s ultimate scope”). 
 132. Dodd-Frank § 1504, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(q)(1)(A). 
 133. Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers, 77 Fed. Reg. 
56,365, 56,373 (Sept. 12, 2012) (originally codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249). 
 134. See PUBLISH WHAT YOU PAY, THE EITI STRATEGY WORKING GROUP: A 
SUMMARY OF PUBLISH WHAT YOU PAY VIEWS 1 (2011), available at http:// 
www.publishwhatyoupay.org/sites/publishwhatyoupay.org/files/EITI%20Strat 
egy%20Working%20Group%20-%20PWYP%20summary%20of%20views.pdf 
(noting that the current scope of the EITI is too narrow). 
 135. In 2002, a Burmese villager brought a suit against Unocal for human 
rights violations under the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA). Doe I v. Unocal 
Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002), vacated and reh’g en banc granted, 395 
F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003). Although the ATCA claim was settled, EarthRights 
International reported continued abuse in 2009. MATTHEW F. SMITH, NEW RE-
PORTS LINK TOTAL AND CHEVRON TO FORCED LABOR AND KILLINGS IN BURMA, 
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In addition to ensuring that all aspects of “commercial de-
velopment” were within the disclosure mandate, Congress gave 
no discretion to the SEC with respect to which companies the 
mandate would apply. Congress defined “resource extraction 
issuer” simply as an issuer that engages in the specified com-
mercial development that is also required to file an annual re-
port with the SEC.136
2. Limited Discretion for “Payment” and “Project” 
 Under this definition, no one is left out. 
Congress granted limited discretion to the SEC in defining 
the level of reportable payment, and perhaps in defining “pro-
ject.” While Congress defined payments to include taxes, royal-
ties, fees, production entitlements, and bonuses, it also includ-
ed “other material benefits” that the SEC determines are “part 
of the commonly recognized revenue stream for the commercial 
development of oil, natural gas, or minerals,” not de minimis.137 
This gave the SEC discretion in adding to the list, which it did 
not do, and defining the minimum reportable amount—that 
which is not significant or “not de minimis.”138 It was important 
to proponents of the rule that the SEC set a low minimum val-
ue to capture as much of the revenue stream as possible, rather 
than ascribe a “materiality” factor or a value relevant to a com-
pany’s balance sheet.139
 
DESPITE FLAWED IMPACT ASSESSMENTS (2009), available at http://www.earth 
rights.org/sites/default/files/documents/press-release-total-impact-getting-it 
-wrong.pdf; see also Marwaan Macan-Markar, BURMA: Pressure Mounts on 
Energy Giant Chevron to Disclose Revenue, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Apr. 29, 
2010, http://www.ipsnews.net/2010/04/burma-pressure-mounts-on-energy 
-giant-chevron-to-disclose-revenue/. Human rights violations surrounding the 
Burmese pipeline were also noted in a comment to the SEC, stating that dis-
closure may enable communities to advocate that payments be used to com-
pensate victims. See Letter from Human Rights Foundation of Monland to 
Meredith Cross, Dir., Division of Corp. Fin., SEC 2 (July 15, 2011), available 
at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-42-10/s74210-99.pdf. 
  
 136. Dodd-Frank § 1504, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(q)(1)(D). 
 137. Id. § 78m(q)(1)(C). 
 138. The Internal Revenue Service defines “de minimis fringe” as “so small 
as to make accounting for it unreasonable or administratively impracticable.” 
26 U.S.C. § 132(e)(1) (2012). 
 139. See Letter from Payal Sampat & Scott Cardiff, Int’l Program Coordi-
nators, Earthworks, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, SEC (Mar. 2, 2011), avail-
able at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-42-10/s74210-58.pdf (recommending 
reporting of payments above $1000); Letter from Publish What You Pay U.S. 
Coalition to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, SEC 4 n.8 (Dec. 19, 2011), available 
at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-42-10/s74210-116.pdf (“[A] reporting 
standard based on materiality to the recipient government is qualitatively dif-
ferent from one based on the materiality of a project or a payment to the re-
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Although defining “not de minimis” was a clear point of 
contention, industry’s argument focused more on the SEC’s 
failure to define “project” when granted discretionary authority 
to do so—or more accurately, to define “project” in a manner 
agreeable to industry when granted the discretion to do so.140 
Project-level reporting may be the most important element in 
the disclosure rule because it has the potential to bring trans-
parency to the community level.141 Congress left “project” unde-
fined. In the end, the SEC also left “project” undefined, stating 
that it believed the term was generally understood by industry 
and that the contract should serve as the basis for its defini-
tion.142 Given the complexity of the multifaceted industry, cov-
ering exploration to export, this was probably a wise decision, if 
not a necessary one. But it doesn’t mean that the SEC left “pro-
ject” open to broad interpretation. The SEC unambiguously re-
jected recommendations by industry commentators, which in-
cluded defining “project” at the country level, as a reporting 
unit, in relation to a particular geological basin or mineral dis-
trict, or by reference to the materiality standard consistent 
with federal securities laws.143
Industry’s opposition to project-level reporting is further 
undermined by the EITI requirements for project-by-project re-
porting in some countries and by companies that voluntarily 
publish such information.
 By requiring disclosure at both 
the “project” and “country” level, Congress clearly did not in-
tend for the terms to be used interchangeably. And considering 
that the primary purpose of disclosure is to empower citizens to 
hold their governments accountable for mismanagement of rev-
enues, Congress must have intended the term “project” to rep-
resent a more defined activity within a country, recognizing 
that citizens will be best equipped to hold their governments 
accountable when the partitioning is such that it allows speci-
ficity at the local or provincial level.  
144
 
porting issuer . . . .”). 
 Even the Financial Times editori-
alized that there was “no justification” for watering down pro-
ject-level reporting, noting that “most payments to states are 
calculated on a project basis anyway, so publishing such detail 
 140. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.  
 141. See Letter from Human Rights Foundation of Monland, supra note 
135. 
 142. Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers, 77 Fed. Reg. 
56,365, 56,382 (Sept. 12, 2012) (originally codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249). 
 143. Id. 
 144. See supra notes 110–11 and accompanying text. 
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is no great burden.”145
3. Required Public Disclosure with No Express Exemptions  
 While industry claims that the rule is 
over-burdensome, the real crux of their argument has nothing 
to do with the amount of effort or expense involved in compiling 
reports, but with the public nature of reporting that the SEC 
has mandated.  
In an effort that would effectively eliminate all possible 
hope for citizens of resource-rich nations, and particularly those 
living under the most corrupt regimes, industry challenged the 
SEC’s failure to exercise discretion with regard to public disclo-
sure and failure to provide an exemption for operations in 
countries with secrecy laws.146 In regard to public disclosure, 
the statute states that “to the extent practicable,” the SEC 
shall make available online a “compilation” of the information 
submitted by industry.147 Industry argued that “compilation” 
could refer to the aggregate data of all issuers on a per country 
basis.148 But the SEC rejected this as inconsistent with the 
plain language of the statute and the transparency goals artic-
ulated by Congress.149 The statute requires that companies in-
clude payment disclosures in their annual reports.150 Under the 
existing Exchange Act, annual reports must be filed publicly,151 
and there is no indication that Congress wanted to make the 
new disclosure reports, or any portion thereof, confidential. 
While the industry groups challenging the rule argued that the 
SEC “grossly misinterpreted its statutory mandate,”152
 
 145. Editorial, Transparency Rules: Oil Companies Are Wrong to Resist 
Publication of Payments, FINANCIAL TIMES, Feb. 26, 2012, http://www.ft.com/ 
intl/cms/s/0/4ebf8410-5f16-11e1-9df6-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1nZRWgsKK. 
 there is 
no evidence that Congress had even considered the option of 
confidential reporting. Instead, Congress focused on developing 
a mechanism for compiling information into an easily searcha-
ble and reviewable format, evidenced by the requirement for 
electronic tags to identify payments according to type, amount, 
 146. Complaint, supra note 15, at 11–12 (alleging violation of the APA and 
Exchange Act). 
 147. Dodd-Frank § 1504, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(q)(3)(A) (2012). 
 148. Complaint, supra note 15, at 16–17. 
 149. See Brief of Respondent SEC at 17–19, Am. Petroleum Inst. v. SEC, 
714 F.3d 1329 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (No. 12-1398), 2013 WL 30051, at *17–19. 
 150. Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers, 77 Fed. Reg. 
56,365, 56,391 (Sept. 12, 2012) (originally codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249). 
 151. See Brief of Respondent SEC, supra note 149, at 18. 
 152. Complaint, supra note 15, at 3–4. 
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currency, business sector, receiving government, and project.153
While it is possible that some level of confidential reporting 
could still further the purpose of empowering citizens, it is dif-
ficult to see how confidentiality and aggregated data could sup-
port investor interests in disclosure or improve the investment 
climate. An investor can only assess the risks of a company’s 
expenditures and practices, project cash flows, and acquisition 
costs and management effectiveness if it has company-specific 
information.
  
154 Furthermore, the rule does not regulate in any 
way the types or amount of payments companies can make to 
foreign governments; it only requires that all payments are re-
ported. Of course, as noted, all payments are subject to the 
rules of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.155
This is particularly important in countries that have secre-
cy laws or prohibit disclosure—countries often defined by their 
autocratic regimes, ripe with corruption, bribery, and conflict. 
The statute itself grants no exemptions, but industry challeng-
ers claimed that the SEC had discretion to provide exemptions 
under the Exchange Act.
 Unless Congress 
intended section 1504 to serve simply as an additional tool for 
identifying corporate corruption, which is not mentioned in the 
legislative record, there is no logical reason that disaggregated 
and company-specific data should be available to the SEC 
alone. As expressly articulated, this information has the sole 
purpose of benefiting citizens of resource-rich countries and in-
vestors, and thus full transparency must extend to those inter-
ested parties.  
156 At the same time, industry com-
mentators failed to provide supporting evidence that the four 
countries they identified—Angola, Cameroon, China, and Qa-
tar—actually have some versions of laws which prohibit disclo-
sure.157
 
 153. See Dodd-Frank § 1504, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(q)(2)(D)(ii) (2012). 
 In fact, several commentators disputed this assertion, 
noting that laws in these countries contain specific provisions 
 154. Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers, 77 Fed. Reg. 
at 56,397. Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association of America-College Re-
tirement Equities Fund (TIAA-CREF) cited the importance of comprehensive 
disclosure in analyzing investment risk. See Letter from Jon Feigelson, Gen. 
Counsel & Head of Corporate Governance, TIAA-CREF, to Elizabeth M. Mur-
phy, Sec’y, SEC (Mar. 2, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7 
-42-10/s74210-54.pdf. 
 155. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.  
 156. See Complaint, supra note 15, at 5–6 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78l(h)). 
 157. Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers, 77 Fed. Reg. 
at 56,411. 
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that permit disclosure to stock exchanges.158 The industry chal-
lengers have yet to produce evidence to the contrary.159
4. Compelled Speech Is Within the Authority of Congress 
 The 
SEC was unconcerned by the potential impact on extraction is-
suers and correctly determined that such exemptions would 
wholly undermine the purpose of the rule. To find otherwise 
would necessarily mean that Congress enacted a law to achieve 
social ends but with no mechanism for reaching those ends—a 
law rendered ineffective from the outset. 
The court did not address industry’s First Amendment 
claim, and it will not be addressed in detail here. However, it is 
likely to arise again, and if accepted, could have much broader 
impact, “call[ing] into question thousands of reporting statutes 
and regulations,”160 many of which mandate reporting of factual 
information similar to that required under the resource extrac-
tion disclosure rule.161 Industry claims that the disclosure rule 
represents “compelled, non-commercial speech” that would 
place companies at a competitive disadvantage.162 This claim is 
weakened by the current voluntary reporting of other compa-
nies such as Statoil, expansion of the EITI, and forthcoming EU 
rules.163 But, it is important to understand the “competitive 
disadvantage” industry is referring to. Industry groups argued, 
“U.S. companies wish to avoid the speech because it is contro-
versial with certain foreign governments.”164 This is an anti-
corruption statute. Of course, disclosure might be controversial 
with some governments. As Global Witness asks, “what are 
[these] companies trying to hide?”165
In tracking the well-defined language of the statute and 
 
 
 158. Id. at 56,370–71. 
 159. See Extracting Oil, Burying Data, supra note 122 (noting industry has 
provided no examples of how local restrictions on publishing confidential con-
tract details would upset U.S. transparency requirements). 
 160. Brief of Intervenor Oxfam America, Inc. at 2, Am. Petroleum Inst. v. 
SEC, 714 F.3d 1329 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (No. 12-1398), 2013 WL 179899, at *2. 
 161. See Brief of Respondent SEC, supra note 149, at 55–56. 
 162. Complaint, supra note 15, at 28. 
 163. Samuel Rubenfeld, Oil Industry Moves Forward with Extractive In-
dustry Rule Lawsuit, WALL ST. J. BLOGS (Dec. 4, 2012 5:37 PM), http:// 
blogs.wsj.com/corruption-currents/2012/12/04/oil-industry-moves-forward-with 
-extractive-industry-rule-lawsuit/. 
 164. Complaint, supra note 15, at 29 (emphasis added). 
 165. Ben Geman, Oil, Business Groups Sue SEC over Disclosure Rule, THE 
HILL (Oct. 11, 2012, 12:16 AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/e2-wire/e2-wire/261377 
-oil-business-groups-sue-sec-over-disclosure-rule.  
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legislative intent—to empower citizens of resource-rich coun-
tries to hold their governments accountable for failing to ad-
dress societal needs—the SEC promulgated a rule which fully 
complies with Congress’s mandate. The question is whether the 
SEC had the authority to comply or if it necessarily should 
have exercised discretion to act in accordance with its obliga-
tions under the Exchange Act.  
C. INDUSTRY’S CHALLENGE TO THE SEC’S MANDATE UNDER THE 
EXCHANGE ACT 
The industry groups challenging the rule argued that the 
SEC failed to exercise its discretionary authority under the Ex-
change Act and acted outside its statutory authority in issuing 
rules which imposed high costs with no quantified benefits.166 
Under the Exchange Act section 3(f), the SEC is required “to 
consider or determine whether an action is necessary or appro-
priate in the public interest” and to “consider, in addition to the 
protection of investors, whether the action will promote effi-
ciency, competition, and capital formation.”167 Under section 
23(a)(2), the SEC is prohibited from adopting rules “which 
would impose a burden on competition not necessary or appro-
priate in furtherance of [the Act].”168 Furthermore, if the SEC 
determines that any burden is necessary or appropriate, it 
shall include reasons for such determination in the rule’s 
statement of basis and purpose.169 In its consideration, the SEC 
recognized first and foremost that Congress intended the rule 
to promote a type of social benefit that differs from the type of 
investor-protection benefits SEC rules generally seek to 
achieve. In this vein, the SEC determined that any potential 
burden the rules impose on industry may be necessary to 
achieve the purpose of the statute—increased transparency for 
a social end.170
 
 166. Complaint, supra note 
 With this understanding, the SEC carefully con-
sidered the economic effects of the rules and, particularly, those 
effects stemming from SEC action on provisions where it was 
granted discretionary authority, to determine whether or not 
the burden could be lessened without frustrating congressional 
15, at 2–7. 
 167. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(f), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(f) (2012) (em-
phasis added). 
 168. Id. § 78w(a)(2) (emphasis added). 
 169. Id.  
 170. Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers, 77 Fed. Reg. 
56,365, 56,398 (Sept. 12, 2012) (originally codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249). 
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intent.171
1. Cost of Necessary Burden on Competition 
 In carefully reviewing all comments relating to pro-
jected costs of compliance, the SEC considered the rule’s effects 
on competition and its ability to achieve its objective without 
unduly burdening industry. 
The SEC considered the qualitative impact of the rule in 
addition to conducting a cost-benefit analysis. It determined 
that disclosure, to the extent it informed investor decision mak-
ing, could improve information efficiency,172 but disclosure had 
the potential to reduce allocative efficiency by diverting capital 
away from other opportunities as shareholders bear the cost of 
compliance.173 Alternatively, the SEC also proposed that disclo-
sure might increase capital formation by increasing investment 
by those who have been able to properly assess the “political 
risk, acquisition costs, and management effectiveness.”174
First, the SEC considered the compliance costs stemming 
from the statutory mandate and the SEC’s exercise of discre-
tion in limiting the definition of “project” and defining “not de 
minimis” as payments over $100,000.
 While 
informative, these considerations are largely speculative, ab-
sent quantification. Therefore, the bulk of the SEC’s considera-
tion involved assessing the costs of compliance.  
175 Relying on estimates 
submitted by one oil and gas company—ExxonMobil—and one 
mining company—Barrick Gold176
 
 171. Id. at 56,397. While the SEC considered the costs stemming from the 
congressional mandate, the SEC had not been granted the authority to exer-
cise discretion in modifying the statutory language for the purpose of reducing 
the economic impact of competition. Id.  
—the SEC calculated the ini-
tial compliance costs using two different methods. In the first 
method, the SEC calculated the average initial compliance 
costs per company, identifying a lower bound of $88,000 (con-
sistent with Barrick Gold estimates) and upper bound of 
 172. Id. at 56,399. 
 173. Id. at 56,403. 
 174. Id. at 56,397; see also Extracting Oil, Burying Data, supra note 122 
(noting one large investor’s belief that the rule would help him assess political 
and regulatory risks and citing a poll showing investors managing $1.2 trillion 
support the rule). 
 175. Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers, 77 Fed. Reg. 
at 56,400. 
 176. Because Barrick Gold and ExxonMobil are both large extraction com-
panies, the SEC found it appropriate to scale costs to the size of the issuer, 
with compliance costs increasing with firm size. Id. at 56,408. 
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$929,000 (consistent with ExxonMobil estimates).177 Multiply-
ing that figure by the 1101 companies impacted by the rule, the 
SEC estimated that the total initial compliance cost would fall 
within the range of $97 million to $1.1 billion.178 In the second 
method, the SEC conducted a similar analysis for small and 
large firms, which represent unequal proportions of the mar-
ket.179 This formula dropped the maximum total compliance 
cost for all firms by half—from $1.1 billion to $459 million—
although the SEC noted that the $1 billion estimate was con-
sistent with estimates provided by commentators and consid-
ered it valid.180 The SEC used the same methods to calculate 
ongoing compliance costs181 and concluded that the total ongo-
ing cost of compliance would be between $200 million and $400 
million annually.182 Although the SEC recognized several limi-
tations to its analysis,183
Additionally, the SEC estimated losses for companies oper-
ating in countries which industry claimed prohibit payment 
disclosure.
 its estimates were based on the data 
available to it and provided by commentators. Its estimates 
were also consistent with commentator estimates. 
184 The SEC assessed the costs of withdrawing from 
one of these countries based on assets reported by those com-
panies and losses a firm would incur if it could not redeploy 
those assets in the host country or had to sell them at a steep 
discount.185 The SEC identified fifty-one out of 1101 companies 
that may be affected.186
 
 177. Id. at 56,408–09. 
 While the SEC’s analysis was limited in 
scope, it determined that commentators’ concerns were war-
ranted—that withdrawing from countries that prohibit disclo-
sure could add billions of dollars of costs and have a significant 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. at 56,409–10. The SEC estimated that small firms represent sixty-
three percent of issuers, while large firms represent thirty-seven percent. Id. 
Small firms are those whose market capitalization is less than $75 million. Id. 
 180. Id. at 56,408–09. 
 181. Id. at 56,410. The SEC based analysis for ongoing compliance costs on 
estimates submitted by Rio Tinto, National Mining Association, and Barrick 
Gold. Id.  
 182. Id. at 56,411. 
 183. Id. at 56,410 n.620. 
 184. See supra note 155 and accompanying text (noting that industry had 
failed to provide evidence that any country prohibited such disclosure). 
 185. Id. at 56,411. 
 186. Id. at 56,411 n.628. Only nineteen of the fifty-one companies operating 
in those countries provided information specific enough for the SEC to use in 
its analysis. Id. 
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impact on a company’s profitability and competitive position.187 
Nevertheless, the SEC remained resolute in its conclusion that 
providing an exemption would be inconsistent with the plain 
language of the statute and would wholly frustrate congres-
sional intent to promote international transparency where it is 
most needed—countries wrought with corruption.188 Thus, the 
SEC concluded that the burden was “necessary or appropriate 
in furtherance of [the Act].”189
2. Benefits Appropriate in the Public Interest Cannot Be 
Quantified with Any Precision and Need Not Be 
 
Congress adopted section 1504 with the explicit purpose of 
providing the transparency necessary to empower citizens of 
resource-rich countries to hold their governments accountable 
for misappropriation of funds.190 Congress additionally noted 
that promoting good governance could lead to political stability, 
an improved investment climate, price stability, and energy se-
curity.191 None of the benefits Congress considered are the type 
that would produce direct economic benefit to investors, but are 
characteristic of benefits that “protect investors” in accord with 
the SEC’s mission. In fact, the SEC noted that disclosure could 
“materially and substantially improve investment decision 
making.”192 It also noted that the benefits to victims of poor 
governance could be significant given the per capita income of 
resource-rich countries.193 Yet, the industry groups challenging 
the rule claim that the SEC failed to determine whether the 
rule was likely to achieve the desired benefits.194
 
 187. Id. at 56,412. 
 They cite 
Commissioner Gallagher’s dissent in which he stated, “we have 
no reason to think the SEC will succeed in achieving complex 
 188. Id. at 56,413. 
 189. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 23(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a)(2) 
(2012). 
 190. 156 CONG. REC. S3815 (daily ed. May 17, 2010) (statement of Sen. 
Cardin). 
 191. Id. at S3815–16. 
 192. Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers, 77 Fed. Reg. 
at 56,398. 
 193. Id. The Brookings Institute suggests that increased transparency, ac-
countability, and governance could provide a three hundred percent develop-
ment dividend to citizens of resource-rich countries. Daniel Kaufmann, SEC’s 
Day of Reckoning on Transparency: Dodd-Frank Section 1504 on Disclosure of 
Natural Resource Revenues, BROOKINGS (Aug. 21, 2012), http://www.brookings 
.edu/research/opinions/2012/08/21-dodd-frank-kaufmann. 
 194. Complaint, supra note 15, at 5. 
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social and foreign policy objectives as to which the policymak-
ing entities that do have relevant expertise have, to date, large-
ly failed.”195
But petitioners err in claiming that the SEC had to deter-
mine whether the rule would likely achieve the desired benefit. 
The SEC need not determine the likelihood of success nor even 
identify a mechanism for measuring success should benefits be 
realized. The SEC need only consider benefits and, where it is 
unable to quantify them, provide explanation.
  
196 As the SEC 
explained, the benefits “cannot be readily quantified with any 
precision.”197 In support of the SEC’s action, members of the 
House and Senate stated in their amicus brief that the provi-
sion of the Exchange Act petitioners cite applies only “where 
Congress asks the [SEC] to consider the ‘public interest.’”198 Be-
cause section 1504 was a “congressional mandate,” they note 
that the public interest would be served by its adoption.199
C. THE RULE SHOULD WITHSTAND FURTHER COURT SCRUTINY 
UNDER THE APPROPRIATE REVIEW STANDARD 
  
Since 2005, the D.C. Circuit has invalidated SEC rulemak-
ing efforts on three occasions on grounds that the SEC failed to 
“consider, in addition to the protection of investors, whether the 
action will promote efficiency, competition, and capital for-
mation”—the statutory review standard required under section 
3(f) of the Exchange Act.200
 
 195. Id. (quoting Gallagher, supra note 
 In Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 
the court held that the SEC violated the APA in stating that it 
would be difficult to determine the costs associated with elect-
21). 
 196. See generally, OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, 2011 REPORT TO CON-
GRESS ON THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND UNFUND-
ED MANDATES ON STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL ENTITIES 4 (2011), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/2011_cb/2011_cba_ 
report.pdf (“Many rules have benefits or costs that cannot be quantified or 
monetized in light of existing information . . . .”). 
 197. Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers, 77 Fed. Reg. 
56,365, 56,398 (Sept. 12, 2012) (originally codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249). 
 198. See Brief Supporting Respondents, supra note 96, at 6. 
 199. Id. 
 200. James D. Cox & Benjamin J.C. Baucom, The Emperor Has No Clothes: 
Confronting the D.C. Circuit’s Usurpation of SEC Rulemaking Authority, 90 
TEX. L. REV. 1811, 1812 (2012); see also Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 
1144, 1148–49 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co. v. SEC, 613 F.3d 
166, 167–68 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133, 
142–44 (D.C. Cir. 2005).  
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ing independent directors.201 The court stated that uncertainty 
did “not excuse the [SEC] from its statutory obligation to de-
termine as best it can the economic implications of the rule it 
has proposed.”202 In American Equity Investment Life Insurance 
Co. v. SEC, the court assessed whether the SEC had appropri-
ately considered whether its rule, disqualifying fixed indexed 
annuities from falling within the definition of an annuity con-
tract as defined by statute, would promote efficiency, competi-
tion, and capital formation.203 Here, the court found that the 
SEC had failed to properly consider the impact on competition 
by only finding that the rule would “bring about clarity in . . . 
an uncertain area of law,” which would enhance competition.204 
The court held that there was no reasoned basis for this conclu-
sion, and that the SEC necessarily should have considered the 
existing level of price competition under state regulation.205 The 
court’s most recent decision was in 2011 and pertained to a rule 
the SEC adopted pursuant to Dodd-Frank.206 In Business 
Roundtable v. SEC, the court held once again that the SEC had 
acted arbitrarily and capriciously in failing to consider the 
rule’s impact on efficiency, competition, and capital for-
mation.207 The court found that the SEC’s cost-benefit analysis 
“had no basis beyond mere speculation” and that the SEC had 
failed to quantify or even estimate the costs companies may in-
cur.”208
In each of these decisions the court had assumed the au-
thority to define what Congress has failed to—what it means to 
“consider” efficiency, competition, and capital formation, a re-
quirement added through the enactment of the National Secu-
rities Markets Improvement Act of 1996.
  
209
 
 201. 412 F.3d at 144; see also Investment Company Governance Act, 69 
Fed. Reg. 46,378, 46,387 (Aug. 2, 2004) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 270). Cham-
ber of Commerce challenged a rule that exempted otherwise prohibited trans-
actions if a certain percentage of a mutual fund’s board were independent. 412 
F.3d at 136. 
 James Cox and Ben-
 202. Chamber of Commerce, 412 F.3d at 144. The court reasoned that the 
SEC has a statutory obligation to inform the public and Congress of the eco-
nomic costs of a rule before it is adopted. Id.  
 203. 613 F.3d at 167.  
 204. Id. at 177. 
 205. Id. at 177–78. 
 206. See generally Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. 
Reg. 56,668 (Sept. 16, 2010) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 232, 246, 249).  
 207. 647 F.3d 1144, 1156 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 208. Id. at 1150. 
 209. National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996 § 106(b), Pub. 
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jamin Baucom argue that the level of review invoked by the 
D.C. Circuit in these decisions is “dramatically inconsistent 
with the standard enacted by Congress.”210 Congress neither de-
fined “consider” nor suggested that the SEC must abandon a 
rule determined not to promote efficiency, competition, and 
capital formation.211 According to Cox and Baucom, “[n]owhere 
in the legislative history did any member of Congress ever spec-
ify, or even suggest, exactly how the SEC should go about ‘con-
sidering’ the enumerated factors, nor did any member ever 
specify exactly what aspect of ‘efficiency,’ ‘competition,’ or ‘capi-
tal formation’ the SEC should consider.”212 Their review of the 
legislative history supports the requirement that the SEC ana-
lyze the potential costs and benefits, including specific analysis 
where practicable. But according to the Congressional Budget 
Office, the 1996 provision was nothing new. It concluded that it 
did not expect the provision to result in any additional cost be-
cause the SEC already conducted such analysis in rulemak-
ing.213 Furthermore, Cox and Baucom note that the provision 
does not require the SEC to “determine” the rule’s effect on effi-
ciency, competition, or capital formation, nor does it prevent 
the SEC from adopting a rule because of uncertainty or nega-
tive impacts.214 This, they assert, provides further evidence that 
Congress did not intend the provision to be particularly de-
manding on the SEC.215
Under the plain language, the SEC considered whether its 
rule adopted out of section 1504 would promote efficiency, com-
petition, and capital formation. It conducted a cost-benefit 
analysis based on information provided by industry and con-
cluded that costs of compliance may reach or potentially exceed 
the highest costs companies claimed they would incur.
 
216
 
L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416, 3424–25 (adding § 3(f) to the Securities Ex-
change Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(f) (2012)). 
 It fur-
 210. Cox & Baucom, supra note 200, at 1813. 
 211. Id. at 1819 (noting that language in a competing Senate version of the 
bill, requiring the SEC’s chief economist to provide an assessment of likely ef-
fects of the rule on the U.S. economy and markets, received a “cool reception” 
in that it placed undue burdens on the SEC and was unnecessary given the 
notice and comment procedure). 
 212. Id. at 1821. 
 213. Id. at 1820. 
 214. Id. at 1821. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers, 77 Fed. Reg. 
56,365, 56,408–11 (Sept. 12, 2012) (originally codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 
249). 
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ther concluded that, in certain circumstances, the rule would 
necessarily place a burden on competition and would have a 
negative impact on both efficiency and capital formation.217 In-
dustry asserted that the SEC acted arbitrarily and capriciously 
in failing to use discretion to reduce the burden incurred.218
The court’s authority for judicial review of agency action is 
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Inc.
  
219 Under Chevron, the court must first ask whether the 
agency had the authority to act220 and, second, whether the 
agency permissibly exercised the authority Congress granted 
it.221
Under the second step of Chevron, the court can invalidate 
an agency-made rule only if it finds that the rule is “arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accord-
ance with law.”
 Congress not only granted the SEC the authority to act, 
but mandated action through section 1504 of Dodd-Frank. SEC 
action may be distinguished from earlier cases in this regard. 
While under Business Roundtable, Chamber of Commerce, and 
American Equity the SEC had the authority to act, Congress 
had not mandated action. This arguably allows the court great-
er scrutiny in assessing the SEC’s interpretation of its authori-
ty.  
222 The American Petroleum Institute court de-
termined that it need not consider this standard.223 According 
to the court, the SEC had erroneously stopped at Chevron step 
one when it took the position that it was bound by the plain 
language of the statute.224
 
 217. Id. at 56,399. 
 The rule was vacated and remanded 
 218. Complaint, supra note 15, at 2–7. 
 219. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 220. Id. at 843 (“The power of an administrative agency to administer a 
congressionally created . . . program necessarily requires the formulation of 
policy and the making of rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by 
Congress.” (alteration in original) (quoting Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 
(1974))). 
 221. Id. at 844 (“Such legislative regulations are given controlling weight 
unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.”). 
 222. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012). 
 223. Am. Petroleum Inst. v. SEC, 953 F. Supp. 2d 5, 12–13 (D.D.C. 2013). 
 224. Id. at 13. The SEC argued that it had “properly determined [at Chev-
ron step one] . . . that Section 13(q) requires the public disclosure of the issu-
ers’ payment information.” Defendant Securities and Exchange Commission’s 
Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum of 
Points and Authorities in Support of Its Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment 
at 39–40, Am. Petroleum Inst., 953 F. Supp. 2d 5 (No. 12-1558 (JDB)), 2013 
WL 2182599. The court responded that “the [SEC] ‘itself has stopped at step 
one,’ believing ‘that it is without discretion to reach another result.’” Am. Pe-
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to the SEC for further consideration.  
There is no reason that the SEC could not promulgate a 
substantially similar rule, so long as it exercises the discretion 
the court states it has.225
D. SECTION 1504 IS BUT ONE EFFORT IN A GROWING MOVEMENT 
TO LEGISLATE TRANSPARENCY FOR SOCIAL BENEFIT 
 Congress expressly stated that the 
disclosure mandate was necessary to promote good governance 
abroad. This places the SEC in a good position to come out with 
an equally strong rule. However, the SEC will be cautioned to 
exercise greater restraint, to follow the intent of Congress 
without unduly burdening industry, and to conduct rigorous 
analysis. This will be no easy feat. 
The SEC pointed to the widening global influence of the 
EITI, proposed disclosure rules in the EU, and listing require-
ments adopted by the Hong Kong Stock Exchange as further 
support of a growing international effort to increase transpar-
ency in the extraction industry.226 Alone, the U.S. disclosure 
rule pertains to ninety percent of the major international oil 
companies, including Chinese companies, and eight out of ten 
of the world’s largest mining companies—only two of which are 
based in the United States.227 While there has been some specu-
lation that companies will leave the U.S. stock exchanges to 
avoid U.S. reporting requirements,228 this would be unlikely 
under a new EITI reporting standard229
 
troleum Inst., 953 F. Supp. 2d at 13 (quoting Arizona v. Thompson, 281 F.3d 
248, 254 (D.C. Cir. 2002)). The court thus concluded, “[a]ccordingly, no defer-
ence to its interpretation is warranted.” Id.  
 and similar EU disclo-
 225. See Samuel W. Cooper & S. Joy Dowdle, Federal Court Vacates the 
SEC’s Section 1504 Reporting Requirements for Payments to Governments by 
Oil, Gas, and Mining Companies, STAY CURRENT (Paul Hastings, Houston, 
Tex.), July 2013, at 2, available at http://www.paulhastings.com/Resources/ 
Upload/Publications/Federal_Court_Vacates_the_SEC%E2%80%99s_ 
Section_1504_Reporting_Requirements_for_Payments_to_Governments_ 
by_Oil,_Gas,_and_Mining_Companies.pdf (“Indeed, a subsequent rulemaking 
process that takes account of Judge Bates’s concerns could still result in rules 
substantially similar to those vacated.”). 
 226. Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers, 77 Fed. Reg. 
56,365, 56,413 (Sept. 12, 2012) (originally codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249). 
 227. 156 CONG. REC. S3815 (daily ed. May 17, 2010) (statement of Sen. 
Cardin); Jamie Drummond, Committing to Natural Resource Transparency in 
Africa Pays, ONE (Sept. 14, 2012), http://www.one.org/us/2012/09/14/commit 
ting-to-natural-resource-transparency-in-africa-pays/. 
 228. See generally Berns, supra note 74.  
 229. See Short, supra note 112, at 8 (noting that it was recognized that the 
“EITI could not require lower reporting standards than Dodd-Frank and the 
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sure rules—a combined effect which will very nearly cover all 
companies in the extraction industry.230 Furthermore, inde-
pendent initiatives of some companies231 and industry groups232
Section 1504 was just one of several efforts by Congress to 
increase corporate transparency for the primary benefit of citi-
zens of foreign nations. As noted, both the conflict minerals 
rule enacted as section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act and the 
proposed Business Transparency on Trafficking and Slavery 
Act seek to increase transparency for similar ends.
 
to improve transparency may be indicative of a broader indus-
try shift toward acceptance of expanded disclosure rules for so-
cial benefit. 
233 Business 
entities and, particularly, transnational corporations have long 
been recognized for the power they have to significantly impact 
human rights—both positively and negatively, directly and in-
directly.234 And the pressure on states to enforce laws aimed at 
requiring business entities to respect human rights—not just 
within their own territory, but with extraterritorial implica-
tions—is growing.235
 
EU regulations”); see also O’Sullivan, supra note 
 After more than a decade of work to draft 
111 (“The EITI needs a way 
of assessing these various innovations against global benchmarks or it will 
struggle to say anything meaningful about them . . . .”). 
 230. See Oil & Mining Companies on Global Stock Exchanges, REVENUE 
WATCH INST., http://data.revenuewatch.org/listings/ (last visited Apr. 22, 
2014). 
 231. See REVENUE WATCH INST., supra note 115; supra text accompanying 
note 115. 
 232. See Bauer, supra note 84; supra text accompanying note 115. 
 233. See supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
 234. See generally Daniel Aguirre, Corporate Liability for Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights Revisited: The Failure of International Cooperation, 42 
CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 123 (noting corporate control over government policy, the 
competing interests of states to protect human rights and attract investment, 
and the need to hold transnational corporations accountable for human rights 
violations); David Weissbrodt & Muria Kruger, Norms on the Responsibilities 
of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to 
Human Rights, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 901, 901 (2003) (“Transnational corporations 
evoke particular concern in relation to recent global trends because they are 
active in some of the most dynamic sectors of national economies, such as ex-
tractive industries, telecommunications, information technology, electronic 
consumer goods, footwear and apparel, transport, banking and finance, insur-
ance, and securities trading.”). 
 235. See OLIVIER DE SCHUTTER ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS DUE DILIGENCE: 
THE ROLE OF STATES 1 (2012), available at http://accountabilityroundtable 
.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/Human-Rights-Due-Diligence-The-Role-of 
-States.pdf (exploring the ways in which states use due diligence regulations 
for business and generally finding that “governments have increasingly failed 
to find a balance between the power of business and the duty of the State to 
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international norms on business and human rights that could 
garner broad support from business, government, and civil so-
ciety, the UN Human Rights Council adopted the Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights in 2011.236 The Guid-
ing Principles implement the UN’s “Protect, Respect and Rem-
edy” framework, whereby states have the responsibility to pro-
tect against human rights violations by business entities and 
businesses have the responsibility to respect human rights in 
their business activities.237 These principles have been endorsed 
and implemented by several international organizations, in-
cluding the OECD and the International Finance Corporation, 
private and multi-stakeholder groups, and several UN Member 
States, including the EU.238 They complement existing volun-
tary corporate social responsibility initiatives, such as the UN 
Global Compact, which boasts over 10,000 corporate partici-
pants,239 and the UN Principles for Responsible Investment Ini-
tiative, which supports investment principles that incorporate 
environmental, social, and corporate governance issues.240
 
protect human rights.”); Larry Catá Backer, On the Evolution of the United 
Nations’ “Protect-Respect-Remedy” Project: The State, the Corporation and 
Human Rights in a Global Governance Context, 9 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 37, 
42 (2011) (discussing the efforts to articulate a transnational regulatory 
framework including state regulatory jurisdiction over corporations beyond 
their borders); Human Rights Due Diligence, INT’L CORP. ACCOUNTABILITY 
ROUNDTABLE, http://accountabilityroundtable.org/initiatives/human-rights 
-due-diligence/ (last visited Apr. 22, 2014) (announcing the Human Rights Due 
Diligence Initiative). 
 In 
 236. Backer, supra note 235, at 65–68; see also Guiding Principles, supra 
note 10. 
 237. See Rep. of the Working Grp. on the Issue of Human Rights & Trans-
national Corps. & Other Bus. Enters., U.N. Human Rights Council, 20th Sess., 
June 18, 2012–July 6, 2012, ¶¶ 7–8, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/20/29 (Apr. 10, 2012) 
[hereinafter U.N. Human Rights Council]; U.N. Secretary-General, Human 
Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, 
¶¶ 18, 22–23, 28–29, U.N. Doc. A/67/285 (Aug. 10, 2012). Guiding Principles 
will be embedded into U.N. human rights treaty bodies and other U.N. pro-
grams, policies, and activities. See id. ¶¶ 19, 21. 
 238. U.N. Human Rights Council, supra note 237, ¶¶ 24–32. 
 239. Overview of the UN Global Compact, UN GLOBAL COMPACT, http:// 
www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/index.html (last visited Apr. 22, 
2014). 
 240. Introducing Responsible Investment, PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE 
INVESTMENT, http://www.unpri.org/introducing-responsible-investment/ (last 
visited Apr. 22, 2014). The more than 1000 signatory firms are “estimated to 
represent 20 percent of the total value of global capital markets.” U.S. SIF 
FOUND., REPORT ON SUSTAINABLE AND RESPONSIBLE INVESTING TRENDS IN 
THE UNITED STATES 5 (2012), available at http://www.ussif.org/files/ 
Publications/12_Trends_Exec_Summary.pdf. 
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fact, growth in sustainable and responsible investing has out-
paced the market, rising from $639 billion in 1995 to $3.7 tril-
lion in 2012.241 According to the Financial Times, “[t]he case for 
public reporting has long been clear.”242
III.  ACHIEVING THE OBJECTIVES OF SECTION 1504 AND 
TRANSPARENCY BEYOND RESOURCE EXTRACTION   
  
Through section 1504 and the SEC’s adoption of a final 
rule, the United States has taken a leadership role in bringing 
transparency to an industry that has fueled corruption, insta-
bility, and poor governance (over development and prosperity), 
and has contributed to the growing needs of some of the world’s 
most vulnerable populations. While there is no false hope that 
U.S. disclosure rules alone will alter practices of revenue mis-
management or misappropriation, this information is a critical 
piece of the solution.  
Industry groups may have gained a victory in the court, 
but there is no reason to believe that it will last. It is clearly 
within the SEC’s authority to promulgate the same or a sub-
stantially similar rule upon further review. And it should. Of 
course, it must be prepared to fight new challenges by some in 
industry—it is important to note that API membership is seem-
ingly divided on the issue. Some critics suggest that this chal-
lenge reveals a great deal about those crying foul. Their fear is 
an inability to compete, yet not everyone shares this concern. 
Surely there are multiple ways of competing. One involves effi-
ciency and innovation in a level playing field; the other involves 
deriving gains from “rent-seeking, monopolistic behavior, brib-
ery of foreign officials and tax avoidance or outright evasion.”243
 
 241. U.S. SIF FOUND., supra note 
 
If this is the group that finds favor with the courts, we are 
clearly on the wrong side of the global call for action.  
240, at 11. 
 242. Transparency Rules, supra note 145. Michael Kerr, Richard Janda, 
and Chip Pitts note a growing global trend to increase transparency in envi-
ronmental and social performance and the important roles both regulatory 
measures and volunteer initiatives have played in driving this trend. KERR ET 
AL., supra note 10, at 241–84. 
 243. See Daniel Kaufmann & Veronika Penciakova, SEC Passes Natural 
Resource Transparency and Conflict Minerals Rules: The Glass Is Fuller than 
Expected, BROOKINGS (Aug. 28, 2012), http://www.brookings.edu/research/ 
opinions/2012/08/28-sec-transparency-kaufmann. 
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A. ACHIEVING THE OBJECTIVES OF SECTION 1504: THE WORK IS 
JUST BEGINNING 
First and foremost, the SEC must promulgate a new rule 
which closely mirrors the rule the court vacated. This will not 
be easy, but it can be done. The primary challenges the SEC 
faces are exercising discretion where it believed it had none 
and preparing for a second round of judicial scrutiny. There is 
significant pressure on the SEC not to weaken the rule—not 
only by members of Congress,244 but by investor groups as well. 
With the new EU Transparency Directive, investors are partic-
ularly concerned that “reporting obligations in [U.S. and EU] 
jurisdictions are as uniform as possible.”245 Consistency in re-
porting requirements—including the definition of project, the 
type of payments, and the minimum reportable payment—will 
reduce the compliance burden for those multinational compa-
nies traded on multiple exchanges and regulated by multiple 
bodies. Additionally, investors claim that the impact the disclo-
sure will have on competiveness has been “significantly over-
stated,” and as such, there should be no exemptions for coun-
tries that prohibit disclosure.246 One group of investors stated, 
“as investors, we stand to benefit more from efficient, competi-
tive markets that enable ethical behaviour than we do from iso-
lated instances of companies gaining a temporary negotiating 
advantage through secrecy.”247
Promulgating a rule capable of withstanding judicial scru-
tiny is only one hurdle. The SEC must also effectively imple-
ment the rule. The SEC received due criticism over its failures 
in oversight that contributed to the global financial crisis.
  
248
 
 244. Letter from Sens. Benjamin L. Cardin et al. to Mary Jo White, Chair, 
SEC (Aug. 2, 2013) (“The new rule should continue to make all reports public 
and should not allow for host country exemptions. We believe the SEC has the 
discretion and authority to retain both of these key aspects of the initial rule 
as long as sufficient analysis and justification is provided in the rulemaking 
process.”). 
 In 
issuing a strong disclosure rule that matched Congress’s man-
date, the SEC took a step in the right direction. But, in order 
for the regulation to have effect, companies must disclose pay-
 245. Letter from Steve Berexa et al. to Mary Jo White, Chair, SEC (Aug. 
14, 2013); c.f., Letter from Jacob de Wit et al. to Mark Pearson, Dir. Gen., Ex-
ternal Relations, Natural Res. Can. (Aug. 14, 2013) (pressing for similar rules 
in Canada). 
 246. Letter from Jacob de Wit et al., supra note 245, at 2.  
 247. Id. 
 248. Stephen Labaton, S.E.C. Concedes Oversight Flaws Fueled Collapse, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2008, at A1. 
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ments, and it will be up to the SEC to ensure compliance. 
Finally, in an effort to move governments toward increas-
ing transparency in resource extraction and further develop 
best practices for disclosure, the United States must remain a 
leader in the EITI. The EITI represents an opportunity to con-
tinue to engage all stakeholders—government, industry, and 
NGOs—in the discussion of transparency and ultimately good 
governance practices. While industry has a large stake in this 
action, it also has a powerful voice. To limit the rule’s impact on 
competition, industry has an interest in using its position with-
in the EITI governing board and multi-stakeholder groups, as 
well as the EU and other markets, to push for a consistent in-
ternational standard that levels the playing field and achieves 
the objectives that all parties seek without unnecessarily bur-
dening economic interests. 
Finally, NGOs and civil society have perhaps the greatest 
challenge. Transparency alone cannot bring better governance. 
Civil society must advocate for justice and the appropriation of 
revenues to provide social benefit for those in greatest need.  
B. LEGISLATING TRANSPARENCY BEYOND RESOURCE 
EXTRACTION 
With growing international focus on corporate social re-
sponsibility, particularly in the EU,249
Alternatively or additionally, it may be necessary for Con-
gress to clarify the SEC’s obligation to “consider” whether ac-
tion is necessary or appropriate in the public interest and 
whether it will promote efficiency, competition, and capital 
formation, as required under the Exchange Act. The type of so-
 Congress may seek to 
expand disclosure mandates to issues of human trafficking, la-
bor standards, environmental risk, or other corrupt practices 
which demand financial transparency. Legal challenge may not 
be avoided; thus, it will be critical that Congress employ similar 
thoroughness in articulating its objectives and attention to de-
tail in drafting new rules, while recognizing the importance of 
removing all hints of agency discretion where it intends to pro-
vide none. This is particularly difficult because it will require 
that Congress take rulemaking authority out of the hands of 
those with particular expertise in the area. It will be incumbent 
on Congress to conduct more rigorous analysis of the potential 
benefits and detriments of a rule up front.  
 
 249. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.  
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cial benefit sought may never be quantifiable, and compliance 
may necessarily place companies that operate internationally 
at a competitive disadvantage if rules are not universally ac-
cepted. Therefore, while “considering” a rule’s impact may gen-
erally be necessary to ensure that regulation does not unneces-
sarily hinder business activity and growth, striking a balance 
between this and social objectives may not be possible for regu-
lation that is almost purely motivated by a social agenda.  
This was clearly the case in the SEC’s cost-benefit analysis. 
Although the court should find the analysis sufficient, it was 
largely an exercise in futility. For instance, the SEC had no in-
tention of granting exemptions for companies operating in 
countries where disclosure was prohibited, thus the effort of 
calculating lost assets and revenue was an exercise in futility. 
If Congress determines that these considerations are nonethe-
less important, it may be necessary to further articulate what 
purpose they serve in the SEC’s evaluation and implementation 
of a legislative mandate.  
Finally, the SEC, after undergoing what is likely to be only 
part one of judicial scrutiny, must be prepared to rigorously 
analyze the statutory language and legislative intent and de-
fend its analysis in each part of the rulemaking process. What 
is required absent congressional action will become clearer as 
the SEC is further tested.  
As noted, disclosure mandates may not fall under the 
SEC’s purview. For instance, the State Department, Depart-
ment of Labor, or Environmental Protection Agency may be 
better equipped to handle issues related to environmental 
damage or the violation of human rights as a result of corporate 
activity. The new SEC disclosure rules—particularly section 
1504, but also the rule on conflict minerals—should serve as 
useful models for expanding social disclosure laws.  
Calls for transparency continue. For some issues, volun-
tary initiatives such as the UN Principles of Responsible In-
vestment Initiative may achieve the objective, but for others, 
mandatory reporting will be necessary. The right balance must 
be struck, but Congress should continue to seek means to quell 
corruption, promote better governance, and foster a strong in-
vestment environment. 
  CONCLUSION   
The international movement for transparency in the ex-
traction industry has been steadily growing over the last dec-
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ade. The EITI has made significant progress in recent years, 
but has been limited to those countries that have been willing 
to take steps toward accountability and better governance. The 
United States is not alone in its push for transparency. The EU 
has also adopted strong disclosure rules, as have other mar-
kets. Congress adopted rules it determined necessary to em-
power citizens in resource-rich countries to hold their leaders 
accountable for misappropriation of extraction revenues, and 
the SEC adopted Congress’s mandate. Following a successful 
challenge by industry groups, in which the court held that the 
SEC failed to exercise discretion because it erroneously be-
lieved it had none, the rule was vacated and remanded for fur-
ther review. There is no reason that, with careful reconsidera-
tion, the SEC cannot promulgate an equally strong rule to 
bring transparency to an industry ripe with corruption, and to 
promote better governance, political stability, and market sta-
bility.  
The rule should serve as a model for future social disclo-
sure initiatives. However, to limit legal challenges, Congress 
should clarify what the SEC must consider in its evaluation 
and implementation of a legislative mandate that seeks social 
benefit and exercise restraint in providing agency discretion. 
Transparency alone is not sufficient to achieve positive social 
ends, but it is necessary.  
 
